An Exploration of Firefighters' Perspectives on Training, the Challenges They Encounter, and Their Impact on Responses to Critical Fire Incidents in Manila

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ABSTRACT

Fire incidents remain a recurring concern in densely populated communities in Metro Manila, where narrow streets, congested neighborhoods, and limited resources can complicate emergency response efforts. While firefighters are trained to operate under hazardous conditions, their work is often affected by operational challenges such as equipment shortages, inaccessible fire hydrants, and civilian behaviors that interfere with response operations. Despite the importance of public cooperation during emergencies, there is limited locally grounded information that explains how civilian actions influence firefighting operations.

This study explores the training experiences and operational challenges of firefighters, with particular attention to how civilian behavior affects emergency response. Using a qualitative research design, data were gathered through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) personnel, volunteer firefighters, and selected stakeholders, including barangay officials, fire safety and operations inspectors, law enforcement personnel, a training officer, and a representative from the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG). Thematic analysis was used to identify recurring patterns from participants' experiences.

The findings reveal that firefighters face both internal and external challenges. Internal challenges include limited equipment, staffing shortages, and resource constraints, while external

challenges include crowd interference, blocked access routes, unauthorized handling of equipment, and limited public understanding of firefighting procedures. Stakeholder insights further supported these findings by highlighting issues in crowd control, coordination, and community preparedness during fire incidents.

In response to these findings, the study proposes a multimedia information campaign composed of infographic videos and a printed brochure. These materials present firefighters' operational realities and provide practical guidance on appropriate civilian behavior before, during, and after fire incidents. The project aims to improve public understanding of how civilian actions affect firefighting operations and promote safer and more cooperative community responses during emergencies in Manila.

Chapter 1: Introduction

The Philippines in the last few years has seen a steady increase in the number of fire incidents recorded by the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP). In 2024, there were 18,256 recorded fire incidents within the country, which is significantly higher compared to the 16,433 recorded fire incidents in 2023, reflecting an increase in fire occurrence nationwide. The rise in fire incidents has also resulted in an increase in casualties and property damage. In 2023, there were 321 recorded deaths and approximately ₱13.2 billion in property damage, while in 2024, this increased to 341 casualties and ₱14 billion in property damage (Manila Bulletin, 2025). These figures highlight the continuing severity of fire incidents in the country, especially in densely populated urban areas.

On September 14, 2025, approximately 700 families were affected by a massive fire that hit Barangay Happy Land in Tondo, Manila (Daily Tribune, 2025). Although reports varied, no casualties were reported. The fire started at around 8:30 PM and was declared out at 6:02 AM the following day (Inquirer.net, 2025). The incident lasted approximately 11 hours, requiring sustained firefighting efforts. Without immediate response from firefighters, the fire could have caused greater destruction, displacement, and possible loss of lives.

Firefighters serve as first responders in emergency situations, particularly in fire incidents. They rely on rigorous training that equips them with the necessary skills to perform their duties during critical fire situations. Despite the hardships of the profession, firefighters remain committed to protecting lives and property. Their responsibilities include fire suppression, rescue operations,

emergency medical response, and situational assessment under highly dangerous conditions. These tasks require physical endurance, technical knowledge, coordination, teamwork, and rapid decision-making in high-risk environments (Philippine Public Safety College, n.d.).

Republic Act No. 9514, also known as the Fire Code of the Philippines of 2008, serves as the legal foundation of the Bureau of Fire Protection. It states that it is the policy of the State to ensure public safety, promote economic development through the prevention and suppression of destructive fires, and professionalize the fire service (Official Gazette, 2008). Under this mandate, the BFP is responsible for enforcing fire safety regulations, responding to fire incidents, and implementing fire prevention programs nationwide.

There are two types of firefighters in the Philippines: personnel from the Bureau of Fire Protection and fire volunteers. According to the Bureau of Fire Protection OLP Guidebook (2023), fire volunteers are individuals who voluntarily enter firefighting service through accredited fire volunteer organizations and undergo similar discipline and training as BFP personnel. Before deployment, they must secure a Certificate of Competency and complete required training and evaluation to ensure readiness in emergency response (DILG, 2008; Bureau of Fire Protection, 2023). While both groups assist in firefighting operations, this study primarily focuses on BFP personnel.

According to the Philippine Public Safety College (n.d.), aspiring firefighters under the BFP are required to undergo the Fire Basic Recruit Course (FBRC) conducted by the National Fire Training Institute. This training includes firefighting techniques, rescue operations, emergency

medical response, hazardous materials handling, fire prevention, and public safety education. In addition to basic training, firefighters must undergo advanced courses such as fire investigation, supervision, and emergency management programs. These trainings ensure that firefighters are equipped with both theoretical knowledge and practical skills necessary for real-life fire response situations.

Despite extensive training, firefighters continue to face operational risks and challenges. In 2024, at least 136 firefighters were reported injured while responding to fire incidents, reflecting the dangers associated with their work (Manila Bulletin, 2025). These risks are further compounded by structural limitations such as shortages in equipment, manpower, and operational resources.

Government and oversight reports have also highlighted resource deficiencies within the Bureau of Fire Protection. Many firefighters reportedly operate with incomplete protective equipment, insufficient fire trucks, and limited water supply systems, which affect response capability (Philippine Star, 2019; Rappler, 2018). In addition, manpower shortages remain a persistent issue, with the BFP not meeting the recommended firefighter-to-population ratio. According to reports, additional personnel are still needed to adequately cover fire protection needs nationwide (Rappler, 2018).

Another critical challenge is the lack of fire infrastructure in several municipalities. In previous reports, many local government units still lack fully functional fire stations or fire trucks, limiting emergency response capacity (Inquirer.net, 2024). Although improvements have been noted over time, gaps in coverage remain both within and outside Metro Manila.

To address manpower limitations, the BFP also works with accredited fire volunteer organizations. These volunteers assist in firefighting operations and undergo required training and certification before deployment (Bureau of Fire Protection, 2023; DILG, 2008). This system helps supplement response capacity, especially in areas with limited personnel.

The government has also introduced measures to improve the fire service. Republic Act No. 11589, or the Bureau of Fire Protection Modernization Act, aims to strengthen the capabilities of the BFP by improving equipment, expanding operational coverage, and enhancing disaster response functions. The law also emphasizes collaboration with local government units in fire prevention, preparedness, and response efforts.

The concept of "critical fire incidents" is important in understanding firefighting operations. Critical fire incidents refer to major fire emergencies that pose immediate and severe threats to life, property, and public safety. These incidents often require coordination among multiple fire stations and agencies. Firefighters face increased risks in these situations due to exposure to hazardous materials, structural collapse, and difficult rescue environments, especially in densely populated urban areas (National Fire Protection Association, 2022; Bureau of Fire Protection, n.d.).

In Metro Manila, several fire incidents demonstrate the complexity of these situations. Large-scale fires in areas such as Tondo, Quezon City, Mandaluyong, and Pandacan have required extensive firefighting efforts, evacuation operations, and inter-agency coordination

(Manila Bulletin, 2024; Rappler, 2020). These incidents highlight the unpredictable nature of critical fire emergencies and the demands placed on firefighters during response operations.

As mentioned, firefighters are directly exposed to high-risk environments as part of their mandate under the Bureau of Fire Protection. The BFP mission states that it is committed to preventing and suppressing destructive fires, investigating fire causes, enforcing the Fire Code, and responding to natural and man-made disasters. Fire Officer 1 personnel are responsible for fire suppression, prevention, investigation, emergency response, and community support (Department of Budget and Management, n.d.).

Despite these responsibilities, multiple reports indicate continuing gaps in resources and infrastructure. Some municipalities still lack adequate fire stations or fire trucks, limiting response capacity (Inquirer.net, 2024). In addition, nationwide reports show that resource shortages remain a concern in fire service operations (Philippine Star, 2019).

Given these conditions, this study aims to explore the experiences of firefighters in Manila, particularly in applying their training during critical fire incidents. It seeks to address the following questions: (1) How do firefighters apply their training during critical fire incidents? (2) What factors hinder them from fully applying their training? (3) How do firefighters adapt to shortages in equipment and personnel? and (4) How does coordination between fire stations function during critical fire incidents?

The study is limited to firefighters operating in Manila, the capital city of the Philippines. Urban environments such as Metro Manila present unique challenges due to high population density, complex infrastructure, and frequent large-scale fire incidents. This study focuses on these conditions to provide a localized understanding of firefighter preparedness, training application, and operational challenges in critical fire response situations.

Chapter 2: Review of Related Literature

Republic Acts about Fire Laws

In relation to the review of the job of firefighters as first responders to fire incidents anchored on the mandate of the BFP as an institution, the proponents revisit Chapter 4 of Republic Act No. 6975, specifically Section 54, which states that the Fire Bureau shall be responsible for the prevention and suppression of all destructive fires on buildings, houses and other structures, forest, land transportation vehicles and equipment, ships or vessels docked at piers or wharves or anchored in major seaports, petroleum industry installations, plane crashes, and other similar incidents, as well as the enforcement of the Fire Code and other related laws.

Relevant to examining organizational factors influencing job performance of firefighters based on the BFP's mandate, the proponents also review Section 56 of Republic Act No. 6975 regarding the establishment of fire stations, which provides that there shall be at least one fire station with adequate personnel, firefighting facilities, and equipment in every provincial capital, city, and municipality, subject to standards, rules, and regulations as may be promulgated by the Department. The local government unit shall, however, provide the necessary site of the station.

To further determine the mandate of the BFP in supporting and preparing firefighters for their job of responding to fire incidents, the proponents review Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9514. It states that the Fire Code shall be administered and enforced by the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) under the supervision and control of the Chief of the BFP through its organizational hierarchy under Republic Act No. 6975. It also authorizes the BFP to support and assist fire

volunteers, practitioners, and fire volunteer organizations, who shall undergo mandatory fire suppression, inspection, rescue, emergency medical services, and related emergency response training and competency evaluations conducted by the BFP.

The Act further provides that the BFP may enter into external party agreements for training and evaluation of fire volunteers and organizations, provided that these remain under the full control and supervision of the BFP. During firefighting operations, fire volunteer organizations shall remain under the direct operational control of BFP fire ground commanders.

Modernization Act

In line with one of the objectives of this paper, which is to examine the impact of training on the response of firefighters to critical fire incidents, the proponents refer to Republic Act No. 11589 or the Bureau of Fire Protection Modernization Act.

The law mandates the BFP to conduct training of its personnel and officers, including fire volunteers, fire safety practitioners, and fire volunteer organizations, pertaining to fire prevention and suppression, fire inspection and clearance, investigation, disaster preparedness, rescue, emergency medical response, HAZMAT, CBRNE, and other operations, provided that such training is coordinated with LGUs.

It also mandates the BFP to conduct monthly fire prevention campaigns and information drives in partnership with the LGUs, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Department of Transportation, and economic zones.

Furthermore, it directs the development and implementation of a comprehensive fire safety and protection program aimed at strengthening the capacity of the national government and LGUs, building fire resilience in communities, and institutionalizing disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness systems. It also encourages the establishment and empowerment of community-based fire volunteer brigades in all LGUs.

Accreditation of Volunteer Fire Brigades

Relevant to examining coordination between the BFP and volunteer organizations, the proponents refer to Memorandum Circular No. 2008-90, which provides policies, guidelines, and accreditation procedures for Volunteer Fire Brigades.

The circular states that to improve cooperation between government firefighters and volunteer fire brigades, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) called for the formulation of operational procedures that define how volunteers may assist the BFP during fire incidents.

It further states that the BFP shall supervise the training of volunteer fire brigades, orienting them on firefighting protocols, coordination, and proper use of resources to avoid unnecessary traffic and operational disruption during fire suppression activities. The BFP is also tasked to establish standard operating procedures (SOPs) that define the role of volunteer fire brigades during firefighting operations.

To effect its legal mandate, the BFP shall evaluate all Volunteer Fire Brigades prior to registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The BFP must endorse the application before the SEC issues a Certificate of Incorporation.

Required Training Programs for Firefighters

In examining the impact of training on firefighters' response to fire incidents, the proponents review the training programs implemented by the Philippine Public Safety College (PPSC).

Firefighters undergo the Fire Basic Recruit Course (FBRC), which runs for approximately four months. It includes firefighting techniques and theory, fire behavior, suppression methods, rescue operations, emergency medical care, hazardous materials awareness, fire prevention, safety protocols, and public fire education.

Firefighters also undergo advanced training programs such as the Fire Officers Basic Course, Fire Officers Candidate Course, Fire Officers Advanced Course, Fire Protection Supervisory Course, and Fire Arson Investigation and Inspection Course for career development and specialization.

Additionally, House Bill 6512 proposes the enhancement of firefighter training by requiring Fire Officer 1 personnel to be certified as medical first responders and emergency medical technicians (EMTs). Under this proposal, FBRC will include advanced emergency medical training, with a transition period for compliance.

An EMT is defined as a trained and certified pre-hospital emergency care provider capable of performing advanced emergency procedures such as CPR, airway management, medication administration, and use of emergency medical equipment. The BFP, in coordination with the Department of Health, TESDA, and local disaster risk reduction offices, shall implement the training program for EMT certification (Reganit, 2023).

Lack of Proper Equipment

Firefighters require specialized equipment to effectively perform their duties. According to Republic Act No. 9514 and the Standardized Public Fire Education (SPFE) Manual, standard firefighting equipment includes fire trucks, hydrants, hose reels, and personal protective equipment (PPE) such as helmets, gloves, boots, and self-contained breathing apparatus.

Coronel (n.d.) states that Filipino firefighters face resource limitations such as outdated fire trucks, insufficient PPE, personnel shortages, and funding deficiencies. Other challenges include inadequate water supply, urban congestion, communication barriers, and bureaucratic delays.

Lagata (2022) further states that scarcity of manpower and firefighting resources significantly hinders the efficiency and effectiveness of firefighters in responding to fire incidents.

Longa (n.d.) adds that modernization efforts depend heavily on LGU funding, while national support is often limited to training, infrastructure, and salaries. As a result, firefighters

are burdened with exhaustion and multiple responsibilities due to limited personnel and outdated equipment.

Theoretical Framework

To evaluate the effectiveness of training conducted by the BFP, this study adopts Kirkpatrick's Model of Training Evaluation, developed by Donald Kirkpatrick in 1959.

The model consists of four levels: reaction (participants' response), learning (knowledge gained), behavior (application of skills), and results (impact on organizational performance).

This study focuses on Level 3 (Behavior) and Level 4 (Results), as these are most relevant in assessing how firefighters apply training during critical fire incidents and how various factors affect their job performance in fulfilling the mandate of the BFP.

Chapter 3: Methodology

The proponents of this study employed a qualitative research design to explore how the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) training influences firefighters' response to critical fire incidents in selected areas in Manila. This approach was chosen to gain an in-depth understanding of lived experiences, operational challenges, and contextual factors affecting the application of training in actual fireground situations. The study utilized semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), and key informant interviews as primary data gathering methods to obtain detailed narratives from stakeholders directly involved in fire response, coordination, training, and disaster management.

The primary participants were career firefighters assigned in selected BFP fire stations in Manila, specifically Paco Fire Sub-Station, Santa Ana Fire Station, and San Nicolas Fire Station, composed of Fire Officers ranging from FO1 to FO3 with at least one year of field experience and recent involvement in fire incident response. Secondary participants included volunteer firefighters from recognized volunteer fire brigades operating in high-risk urban communities in Manila who also have at least one year of experience and exposure to fire incidents.

To further enrich the data, key informants were also included, consisting of barangay officials and tanods from Barangay 52 and Barangay 105, personnel from the Philippine National Police Station 1, BFP fire safety inspectors and operations officers from Paco, Santa Ana, and San Nicolas Fire Stations, a representative from the BFP Headquarters, a representative from the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), and a BFP training officer involved in

fire safety education and training development. Demographic information such as years of service, rank or position, and assigned station or office were collected to contextualize participant responses.

The first phase of data gathering involved semi-structured interviews with both career and volunteer firefighters. These interviews focused on their experiences during critical fire incidents, the application of training in real-life situations, perceived gaps between training and actual field conditions, challenges encountered during fire suppression and evacuation, and recommendations for improving training programs. Participants were asked to describe specific fire incidents where their training was either effectively applied or insufficient, allowing the researchers to identify patterns in behavior, decision-making, and operational limitations.

The second phase involved focus group discussions with six participants per group from both BFP firefighters and volunteer firefighters, all with at least one year of experience and recent involvement in fire incidents. The FGDs explored challenges that prevent full application of training, the impact of crowd behavior and civilian interference, communication and coordination among agencies, operational limitations such as road access and water supply, teamwork and command structure effectiveness, and recommendations for improving training and fire response systems. All questions were open-ended to encourage discussion and allow participants to freely share their experiences and insights.

Key informant interviews complemented these findings by examining inter-agency coordination, crowd control and evacuation management, hydrant maintenance and water supply

issues, training development and policy implementation, communication systems, and institutional and resource constraints affecting fire response operations.

This study is anchored on Organizational Behavior Theory, which examines how individual behavior, group dynamics, and organizational structures influence workplace performance, and applies the Kirkpatrick Four-Level Training Evaluation Model, particularly Level 3 (Behavior) and Level 4 (Results). Level 3 evaluates how training is transferred and applied in actual fire response situations, while Level 4 examines the outcomes of such application in terms of operational effectiveness and incident response results. Through this framework, the study assessed how BFP training translates into firefighter behavior during critical fire incidents and how external factors such as infrastructure limitations, crowd behavior, inter-agency coordination, communication gaps, and resource constraints affect the application of learned competencies.

Data gathered from interviews and FGDs were analyzed using thematic analysis, where responses were coded and grouped into recurring themes such as infrastructure limitations, crowd interference, training gaps, coordination challenges, and resource constraints. Triangulation was employed by comparing responses from multiple stakeholders, including firefighters, barangay officials, police personnel, training officers, and government representatives, to ensure validity and consistency of findings.

Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusions

In the endeavor to provide answers to the research questions in this paper, the proponents conducted four runs of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and fifteen interviews. The first three runs of FGDs were conducted with six Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) firefighters at Paco Manila Fire Sub Station, Santa Ana Fire Station, and San Nicolas Fire Station, with positions ranging from Fire Officer 1s to Fire Officer 3s who have been in service for at least one year. The fourth run of FGD was conducted with volunteer firefighters from the Ermita Malate Fire and Rescue Volunteer Group, who have also been in service for at least one year. In addition, the proponents conducted two interviews with BFP firefighters, two interviews with volunteer firefighters, three interviews with Operations Inspectors/Fire Safety Inspectors, one interview with a BFP trainer, one interview with a Fire Senior Superintendent, and one interview with a DILG representative. Interviews were conducted to validate, complement, and expound on the information gathered from the FGDs, and to include insights on policies, budgeting, training structures, and operational coordination that go beyond frontline experiences. Appendix A shows consent forms indicating the names, positions, and signatures of all interviewees and FGD respondents.

As a point of reference for the discussions in this chapter, the proponents restate the research questions as follows: 1.) What are the firefighters' experiences in applying their training to real life critical fire incidents?; 2) What challenges do firefighters encounter that prevent them from fully applying their learnings during actual fire situations?; 3) With the report of shortage of equipment and personnel from the BFP, how do current personnel adapt to offset the

shortage?; 4) How is the coordination between different stations when responding to critical fire incidents?

As a starting point in enabling the proponents to respond to these research questions, below in Appendices C through J are the capsulized responses of the FGD and interview respondents.

To answer **RQ1**, anchored on Kirkpatrick's model for assessing the effectiveness of training programs—specifically Level 3 (Behavior/Application), the proponents examined **how firefighters' training translates into action during critical fire incidents**. Findings from individual interviews with BFP firefighters, volunteer firefighters, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews reveal that training significantly shapes operational decision-making, discipline, and safety practices, but its application is consistently mediated by contextual constraints.

Firefighters from the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) described how formal training programs such as the Basic Recruit Course and subsequent specialized modules enabled them to apply fire size-up techniques, hose management, search and rescue procedures, use of personal protective equipment (PPE), and emergency medical response during real incidents. Individual BFP interviewees recalled that physical endurance training and repeated drills allowed them to remain operational during prolonged fires, including large-scale incidents involving multiple alarm levels. Similarly, volunteer firefighter interviewees emphasized the importance of discipline, teamwork, and adherence to safety protocols developed through drills and simulations. Zero-visibility exercises, smoke-reading techniques, and EMS/BLS training were frequently cited as directly transferable to actual fireground conditions.

The focus group discussions further highlighted that training instills not only technical skills but also mental readiness and situational awareness. Participants noted that while textbook knowledge provides a foundation, actual application depends heavily on experiential learning reinforced by simulations and drills. This observation aligns with the perspective of a training officer, who explained that firefighter training is intentionally structured to be predominantly skills-based, prioritizing muscle memory, adaptability, and instinctive responses over purely theoretical instruction. According to this perspective, such an approach prepares firefighters to navigate unpredictable environments such as narrow urban roads, congested communities, and structurally complex buildings.

Despite the perceived relevance of training, respondents consistently acknowledged limitations in fully applying what they had learned. Individual firefighters from both BFP and volunteer groups cited insufficient equipment, limited access to specialized training, and the absence of regular refresher courses as barriers. These constraints were echoed by higher-level officials, who noted that while standardized training modules exist, their reach and frequency are shaped by budgetary ceilings and equipment availability. A representative familiar with government budgeting processes explained that training allocations are submitted annually and generally increase only marginally, which restricts expansion and specialization. Nonetheless, across all respondent groups, training was still viewed as the cornerstone of effective response, providing structure, standard operating procedures, and a shared operational language that guides action during critical incidents.

To answer **RQ2:** Stemming from Kirkpatrick's model for determining the impact of training on job performance, the proponents also explored non-training factors that may

influence the job performance of firefighters. Firefighters from both the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) and volunteer organizations **identified numerous challenges that prevented them from fully applying their training during real-life critical fire incidents**, most of which stemmed from **environmental, organizational, and resource-related barriers.**

Environmental conditions emerged as a dominant challenge across interviews and FGDs. Firefighters described congested neighborhoods, narrow alleys, illegally parked vehicles, and heavy traffic as recurring obstacles that delay response time and restrict maneuverability. Civilian behavior further complicated operations, with respondents recounting instances of panicking residents obstructing hoses, crowding access points, or interfering with equipment. Perspectives from barangay officials and a law enforcement interview reinforced this observation, noting that crowd control during fires is difficult due to heightened emotions, limited manpower, and varying levels of public awareness regarding emergency protocols.

Fire hydrant accessibility and functionality were repeatedly identified as critical operational barriers. Interviews with personnel involved in fire safety inspection and operations revealed that hydrant defects, low water pressure, hidden or obstructed hydrants, and delayed maintenance significantly affect suppression efforts. While hydrant maintenance is under local government or utility responsibility, operational personnel emphasized that firefighters often discover defects only during emergencies, forcing them to improvise or seek alternative water sources. These findings corroborate firefighter accounts that water supply issues are among the most disruptive non-training factors during fire response.

Organizational and resource-related challenges further limited performance. Respondents across BFP and volunteer groups cited shortages of functional SCBAs, damaged or outdated PPE, malfunctioning radios, and aging firetrucks. Communication breakdowns were also

common, with weak radio signals, frequency congestion, and incompatible communication systems disrupting coordination among responding units. Law enforcement perspectives highlighted that while coordination protocols exist, their effectiveness depends on real-time communication and clearly defined roles, which are not always achievable during large-scale incidents. Collectively, these non-training factors demonstrate that effective performance is contingent not only on individual competence but also on systemic and environmental conditions beyond firefighters' control.

To answer **RQ3**, the proponents examined **how firefighters compensate for shortages in equipment, personnel, and facilities** during actual fire incidents. Data from interviews and FGDs show that both BFP and volunteer firefighters rely on adaptive and improvised strategies to sustain operations despite persistent resource limitations–which is evident in the accounts of their inventory in Appendices E through L.

Volunteer firefighters reported personally financing equipment maintenance, SCBA refills, and even travel to other provinces to access adequate training facilities. They described maximizing limited resources by carefully maintaining PPE, sharing equipment across units, and relying on alternative water sources such as open wells or nearby bodies of water. Individual volunteer interviewees emphasized that these strategies are driven by commitment to service rather than institutional support.

BFP firefighters similarly described coping mechanisms rooted in improvisation. Due to limited SCBAs, some personnel resort to using wet towels or handkerchiefs during smoke exposure, while PPE is repeatedly washed and repaired to extend usability. Firetrucks are kept operational through makeshift repairs, and firefighters sometimes purchase essential tools using personal

funds. Personnel shortages further exacerbate strain, with some stations operating below ideal staffing levels, requiring individuals to perform multiple roles during incidents.

Insights from operational officers and senior officials reinforced that while these coping strategies allow continued response, they compromise safety and efficiency. Respondents emphasized that reliance on improvisation should not be normalized and pointed instead to the need for increased equipment provisioning, additional manpower, improved hydrant infrastructure, and sustained investment in facilities. These findings underscore a critical gap between expected operational standards taught in training and the realities firefighters face in the field.

To answer **RQ4**, the proponents examined **coordination among different fire stations and agencies** during critical fire incidents. Results indicate that coordination follows established protocols but is uneven in execution due to communication, command, and resource challenges.

BFP personnel described coordination through radios, mobile phones, landlines, and digital messaging platforms, with response allocation guided by the running card system based on alarm levels and geographic jurisdiction. Volunteer groups operate parallel communication structures, relaying information through their mother organizations and coordinating deployment during large-scale incidents. In major fires, an Incident Command Post (ICP) is established to centralize decision-making, evacuation efforts, and inter-agency coordination.

Despite these systems, respondents identified persistent coordination challenges. Differences in command structures between BFP and volunteer organizations sometimes led to confusion, particularly when multiple leaders issued directives. Communication limitations, including weak signals and unregistered radio systems, further hindered synchronized response.

Perspectives from barangay officials and law enforcement highlighted the importance of unified command and clear role portrayal, especially for crowd control, perimeter security, and evacuation management.

Nevertheless, positive coordination practices were also observed. Respondents noted that resource sharing among stations and organizations was generally cooperative, with equipment borrowed and returned responsibly. Differences in specialization were often advantageous, as some units contributed ambulances or technical rescue expertise. Training personnel and senior officials emphasized that unified training programs, standardized equipment, and strengthened communication infrastructure would significantly enhance coordination effectiveness during multi-agency responses.

Conclusion

This study concludes that while firefighter training in the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) and volunteer organizations is fundamentally effective in equipping responders with essential technical skills, discipline, and decision-making capacity, its full application during critical fire incidents is significantly constrained by non-training factors beyond the control of individual firefighters. Anchored on Kirkpatrick's Level 3 model, the findings show that learning is transferred to the field; however, real-world conditions strongly mediate how, when, and to what extent this learning can be applied.

Firefighters from both BFP and volunteer groups demonstrated that formal training provides a vital foundation for fire suppression, rescue operations, and safety practices. Practical, skills-based instruction (reinforced through drills and experience) enables responders to act decisively under pressure. Nevertheless, interviews with frontline firefighters, trainers, and

senior officials revealed that limitations in equipment availability, manpower, refresher training access, and communication systems reduce operational efficiency and compromise safety. Budgetary constraints, as explained by BFP headquarters and the DILG, further restrict the expansion of specialized training and modernization efforts, highlighting systemic issues rather than individual shortcomings.

The study also establishes that environmental and social factors play an important role in fireground performance. Congested urban settings, malfunctioning or inaccessible fire hydrants, traffic conditions, and civilian behavior (including panic, interference, and lack of fire awareness) repeatedly hinder firefighting operations. Insights from barangay officials, fire safety inspectors, and the PNP confirm that fire response is not solely a firefighting concern but a shared responsibility among local governments, law enforcement, and communities. Weak coordination and fragmented responsibilities, particularly in hydrant maintenance and crowd control, further worsen operational challenges.

Despite these constraints, firefighters consistently demonstrate resilience and adaptability. Both BFP and volunteer responders compensate for shortages through improvisation, personal resource investment, inter-station cooperation, and reliance on experience. While these coping mechanisms allow continued service delivery, the study finds that they are unsustainable and may expose firefighters to increased risk. Effective coordination across stations and agencies exists in structure but remains uneven in execution due to communication limitations, differing command systems, and resource disparities.

Overall, the findings emphasize that improving fire response effectiveness requires a holistic approach that goes beyond training alone. **Strengthening inter-agency coordination, ensuring functional infrastructure such as fire hydrants, increasing budget support for equipment**

and manpower, and enhancing community fire awareness are essential to maximizing the real-world impact of firefighter training. Without addressing these systemic and environmental factors, the potential of even the most well-designed training programs will remain constrained during actual critical fire incidents.

Chapter 5: Project Brief

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

This project is a multimedia information and engagement campaign composed of short informational videos and a brochure. It is designed as supplementary material for existing barangay fire drills, fire prevention seminars, and community-based safety orientations. It aims to support the communication between firefighters and civilians by addressing gaps in public understanding, operational realities, and community behavior during critical fire incidents. The chosen mediums are designed to assist barangay and local fire safety programs in delivering clearer and more accessible guidance. These materials function as practical communication tools that guide civilians on appropriate actions before, during, and after fire incidents, emphasizing safety, coordination, and shared responsibility during emergency situations rather than passive awareness.

RATIONALE

The proponents chose this topic in response to observed gaps between firefighters and civilians during critical fire incidents, where public behavior, misunderstanding, and emotional responses often affect the safety and effectiveness of fire response operations. While firefighters from the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) and volunteer brigades are frequently present during emergencies, the realities of their work, including operational constraints, resource limitations, and on-ground challenges, are not always clearly understood by the communities they serve. Findings from the study's Focus Group Discussions and interviews reveal recurring issues such as crowd interference, blocked access routes, improper handling of fire equipment, and limited awareness of proper actions during emergencies. These behaviors are often unintentional but can delay response time and increase risks during fire incidents. At the same time, data also shows that firefighters consistently rely on structured training, coordination systems, and adaptability to manage unpredictable conditions in the field. As multimedia arts students, the proponents identified the need to translate these research findings into accessible, visual, and instructional materials that can be integrated into existing barangay fire drills and fire safety seminars. Through infographic videos and brochures, the project aims to provide clear, step-by-step guidance on fire prevention, preparedness, response, and post-fire actions. The project is grounded on real firefighter experiences and is designed to function as a practical support tool within community-based fire safety programs.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES

This project seeks to:

- Translate firefighters' experiences and operational realities into clear, accessible, and instructional visual content suitable for community fire safety use.
- Develop supplementary infographic videos and brochures that support existing barangay fire drills and fire prevention seminars by organizing fire safety information into prevention, preparedness, response, and post-fire guidance.
- Communicate appropriate and inappropriate civilian behaviors during fire incidents based on real operational experiences of firefighters, particularly those that affect safety, access, and emergency response efficiency.

KEY MESSAGES

The project aims to express that:

For Project Objective 1: Translate firefighters' experiences and operational realities into clear, accessible, and instructional visual content suitable for community fire safety use.

- Firefighters encounter real operational challenges such as electrical fire risks, access limitations, crowd interference, and resource constraints during fire incidents. These experiences are translated into simplified and visual instructional content that can be understood and applied by the general public during community fire safety programs.

For Project Objective 2: Develop supplementary infographic videos and brochures that support existing barangay fire drills and fire prevention seminars by organizing fire safety information into prevention, preparedness, response, and post-fire guidance.

- Fire safety must be understood as a complete process that includes prevention, preparedness, response, and post-fire actions. Clear and structured guidance helps communities respond more effectively during emergencies and reduces behaviors that may interfere with firefighting operations.

For Project Objective 3: Communicate appropriate and inappropriate civilian behaviors during fire incidents based on real operational experiences of firefighters, particularly those that affect safety, access, and emergency response efficiency.

- Civilian actions during fire incidents directly affect the safety and efficiency of fire response operations. Behaviors such as blocking access routes, interfering with equipment, or failing to follow instructions can delay firefighting efforts, while proper cooperation supports faster and safer response.

TARGET USER, BENEFICIARY AND POTENTIAL PARTNERS

The primary target users of this project are Filipino citizens, aged 13 and above, particularly those living in fire-prone or densely populated areas around Manila. These individuals are the ones whose actions during fire incidents (such as obstructing access routes, interfering with firefighting operations, or failing to follow safety guidance) directly affect the effectiveness and safety of fire response operations. The project's multimedia outputs, including infographic videos and brochures, are designed as supplementary materials for barangay fire drills and fire prevention seminars, helping communities better understand operational realities and appropriate behavior during emergencies.

The beneficiaries of the project include active firefighters and volunteer fire brigades, who may benefit from improved public cooperation during operations and reduced instances of obstruction or miscommunication during fire incidents. These beneficiaries are typically from age 18–50+ and consist mainly of male fire personnel. They generally fall within middle to lower economic and social classes, given the typical compensation levels of firefighters in the Philippines and the voluntary nature of many brigades. Finally, this project also indirectly benefits the Filipino public, who rely on efficient fire response for safety and property protection.

The potential partners of the proponents for the project include institutions that can contribute expertise, resources, training facilities, or policy support. These include local government units (LGUs) in Manila; public safety agencies such as the Philippine National Police (PNP) for crowd control coordination; community organizations both government-affiliated and non-government organizations (NGOs) for awareness and seminar integration; and schools or training institutions that support fire safety education. Fire stations and barangay offices are also key partners since the materials are intended to be used directly in their fire drills and community seminars.

User Profile

Joy de Luna is a 19-year-old college student living in Tondo, Manila. She comes from a lower-middle-income family, with her father working as a jeepney driver and her mother working as an online seller. Growing up in the city, she has witnessed several fire incidents within their barangay, but mostly from a distance through sirens, social media, or news reports. While she considers firefighters to be everyday responders during emergencies, she has limited understanding of what they experience during actual operations, including environmental risks, physical demands, and challenges caused by crowd behavior. Joy is curious, empathetic, and active online, frequently engaging with short-form videos and visual content. However, she rarely encounters accessible materials that explain firefighter experiences or show how civilian behavior affects emergency response. Since she and her family live in an area at risk for fires, she wants to be more informed but often finds official materials too technical or disconnected from real situations. A multimedia project that is visually engaging and grounded in actual fire incident contexts would help her better understand proper behavior during emergencies and the realities faced by firefighters in the field.

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Appendices:

Appendix A

Interview Consent Forms

Data Privacy Notice

De La Salle-College of Saint Benilde (DLS-CSB) respects your right to privacy and is committed to protect the confidentiality of your personal information. DLS-CSB is bound to comply with the Data Privacy Act of 2012 (RA 10173), its implementing Rules and Regulations and relevant issuances of the National Privacy Commission.

It has adapted reasonable administrative, physical and technical measures to prevent loss, misuse and alteration of the information under our control.

By filling up this form, you are consenting to the collection, processing and use of the information in accordance to this privacy notice. The following information are collected and processed: name, position, number of years working as firefighter.
Only authorized individuals from De La Salle-College of Saint Benilde will have access to this information and will not be disclosed to third parties without your permission.

The information you have provided will be used for any or all of the following: evaluation, documentation and communication purposes.

De La Salle-College of Saint Benilde (DLS-CSB) shall only retain the said personal information until it serves its purpose, after which it shall be securely disposed of.

If you have concerns and queries on Data Privacy, email dpo@benilde.edu.ph

Interview:

RANDEL SHANE D. GARCIA
Signature Under Printed Name

LUCIANO PACALINO JR.
BRYAN ASCUH
EDDIN ROSD ROSP
ALFredo CUBE
Lim, William Kenji

FGD:

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SFO1 BERNAR A DUYAN

Signature Under Printed Name

FO3 RONALD C MALABAO

FO2 JAMES NOVEN O AVENIDO

FO2 JOHN PAULO A TUJADA

FO1 JOHN MARIE A BULANON

FO1 CHRISTIAN KESTER C TABACO

An Exploration of Firefighters' Perspectives on Training, the Challenges They Encounter, and Their Impact on Responses to Critical Fire Incidents in Manila

DATA PRIVACY NOTICE

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By filling up this form, you are consenting to our collection and processing including official DLS-CSB photo and video documentation, processing and use of the information in accordance to this privacy notice. The following information is collected and processed: **Name, Position, Years in the Field.**

The information you have provided will be used for any or all of the following: **Evaluation, Documentation and Communication Purposes**.

We also use information gathered from you for abuse prevention and privacy protection.

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_____

Signature Under Printed Name

SFO2 ROSITO P ARBOLEDA II -
SFO2 ROPERNUK M ANDRES -
FO2 KONNEL N DACUMOS -
FO1 ROBL N DUEÑAS -
FO1 Ralph Albert M Cabbvag -
FO1 Kyll B Medrano

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Annabelle C Pantilla, BFP

Signature Under Printed Name

CHRISTIAN REESTER C TAROPCO

An Exploration of Firefighters' Perspectives on Training, the Challenges They Encounter, and Their Impact on Responses to Critical Fire Incidents in Manila

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SFO2 Rolito D Arbolada II

Signature Under Printed Name

An Exploration of Firefighters' Perspectives on Training, the Challenges They Encounter, and Their Impact on Responses to Critical Fire Incidents in Manila

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REDENTO L GAPUZ

Signature Under Printed Name

An Exploration of Firefighters' Perspectives on Training, the Challenges They Encounter, and Their Impact on Responses to Critical Fire Incidents in Manila

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Bryan A Dela Cruz
Signature Under Printed Name

Candido Christian A. Lapuz

Cesar P. Barroga Jr

RUPERT V BOBADILLA

Emmanuel O Umali

Revi-Jun Leopoldo

Appendix B

Inventory of Sta. Ana Fire Sub Station

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION - NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
MANILA FIRE DISTRICT - STA. ANA FIRE SUB STATION
Pedro Gil St near Tejeron Sta. Ana, Manila
Tel. No. 5310-7667
Email add:staanafs@gmail.com

INVENTORY OF PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)
FIRE BOOTS
SAO MANILA FIRE DISTRICT BFP-NCR
As of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-03

RHQ/Province/District City/Municipal Fire Station	NUMBER OF OPERATIONS PERSONNEL																					Total Number of Operations Personnel			FIRE BOOTS														
	OFFICERS					Total Number of				Total Number of Officers	NON-OFFICERS									Total of NOR				Number of Serviceable Fire Boots MALE (sizes)															
											SFO				FO			Number of																					
	CSUPT	SSUPT	SUPT	CINSP	SR INSP	INSP	CINSP to CSUPT	INSP to SINSP	Male	Female		4	3	2	1	3	2	1	Male	Female		Male	Female	Total	7	7.5	8	8.5	9	9.5	10	10.5	11	11.5	12	12.5	13	Total
							A	B	C	D	E=A+B								F	G	H	I=C+F	J=D+G	K=I+J														L
1. SFO4 Enriquez, MD B											0	1							1		1	1	0	1							1							1
2. SFO3 Bobadilla, R V											0		1						1		1	1	0	1							1							1
3. SFO3 Erlanda, J M											0			1					1		1	1	0	1							1							1
4. SFO1 Cadiz, J B											0				1				1		1	1	0	1							1							1
5. SFO1 Gapuz, R L											0				1				1		1	1	0	1							1							1
6. FO3 Ty, M M											0					1			1		1	1	0	1							1							1
7. FO3 Umali, E O											0					1			1		1	1	0	1							1							1
8. FO3 Villalobos, J E											0					1			1		1	1	0	1							1							1
9. FO2 Wanawan, A C											0						1		1		1	1	0	1					1									1
10. FO1 Leopoldo, R O											0							1	1		1	1	0	1					1									1
11. FO1 Perlas, JC B											0							1	1		1	1		1					1									1
12. FO1 Damih, A P											0							1	1		1	1	0	1														0
											0										0	0	0	0														0
											0										0	0	0	0														0
											0										0	0	0	0														0
TOTAL >>>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	3	1	3	12	0	12	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	3	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	11

Prepared by

FO1 Revi-Jun O Leopoldo
Crew

Certified Correct by

SFO3 Rupert V Bobadilla
Shift-in-Charge

Noted by

SFO4 Mark Daniel B Enriquez
Sub-Station Commander

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION - NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
MANILA FIRE DISTRICT - STA. ANA FIRE SUB STATION
Pedro Gil St near Tejeron Sta. Ana, Manila
Tel.No. 5310-7667
Email add:staanafs@gmail.com

INVENTORY OF FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT (FIRE NOZZLE)
REQUIREMENT DATA
SAO MANILA FIRE DISTRICT BFP-NCR
for the Month of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-08

RHQ/Province/District	BFP OWNED FIRE ENGINES				FIRE NOZZLE					
City/Municipal					1½ size			2½ size		
Fire Station	Serviceable	Unserviceable	Under Repair	TOTAL	Ideal No.	Number of Serviceable Fire Nozzle	SHORTAGE	Ideal No.	Number of Serviceable Fire Nozzle	SHORTAGE
	A	B	C	D= A+B+C	E =D X (2 Units)	F	G = E - F	E_1 =D X (2 Units)	F_1	G_1 =E_1 -F_1
MFD OFFICES				0	0		0	0		0
SRF				0	0		0	0		0
EMS				0	0		0	0		0
SAN NICOLAS				0	0		0	0		0
TANDUAY				0	0		0	0		0
PACO				0	0		0	0		0
INTRAMUROS				0	0		0	0		0
PANDACAN				0	0		0	0		0
TONDO				0	0		0	0		0
SAN LAZARO				0	0		0	0		0
STA MESA				0	0		0	0		0
GAGALANGIN				0	0		0	0		0
STA ANA	1	0	0	1	2	2	0	2	2	0
ARROCEROS				0	0		0	0		0
SAMPALOC				0	0		0	0		0
MALACAÑANG				0	0		0	0		0
BACOOD				0	0		0	0		0
TOTAL >>>	1	0	0	1	2	2	0	2	2	0

Prepared by:

FO1 Revi-Jun O Leopoldo
Crew

Certified correct:

SFO3 Rupert V Bobadilla
Shift-In-Charge

Noted by:

SFO4 Mark Daniel B Enriquez
Sub-Station Commander

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION - NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
MANILA FIRE DISTRICT - STA. ANA FIRE SUB STATION
Pedro Gil St near Tejeron Sta. Ana, Manila
Tel. No. 5310-7667
Email add:staanafs@gmail.com

INVENTORY OF PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)
FIRE HELMET
SAO MANILA FIRE DISTRICT BFP-NCR
As of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-01

RHQ/Province/District City/Municipal Fire Station	NUMBER OF OPERATIONS PERSONNEL																				Total Number of Operations Personnel			FIRE HELMET Number of Serviceable Fire Helmet				Shortage of Fire Helmet	Shortage By Color			
	OFFICERS						Number of					NON-OFFICERS												COLOR								
												SFO			FO			Number of														
	CSUPT	SSUPT	SUPT	CINSP	SR INSP	INSP	CINSP to CSUPT	INSP to SINSP	Male	Female	Total Number of Officers	4	3	2	1	3	2	1	Male	Female	Total of NOR	Male	Female	Total	Yellow (NOR)	Red (INSP-SINSP)	White (CINSP-CSUPT)	Total		Yellow (NOR)	Red (INSP-SINSP)	White (CINSP-CSUPT)	Total
							A	B	C	D	E=A+B								F	G	H	I=C+F	J=D+G	K=I+J	L	M	N	O = SUM(L to N)	P=K-O	Q=H-L	R=B-M	S=A-N	T= sum(O to Q)
1. SFO4 Enriquez, MD B											0	1							1		1	1	0	1	1			1	0	0	0	0	0
2. SFO3 Bobadilla, R V											0		1						1		1	1	0	1	1			1	0	0	0	0	0
3. SFO3 Erlanda, J M											0			1					1		1	1	0	1	1			1	0	0	0	0	0
4. SFO1 Cadiz, J B											0				1				1		1	1	0	1	1			1	0	0	0	0	0
5. SFO1 Gapuz, R L											0				1				1		1	1	0	1	1			1	0	0	0	0	0
6. FO3 Ty, M M											0					1			1		1	1	0	1	0			0	1	1	0	0	1
7. FO3 Umali, E O											0					1			1		1	1	0	1	1			1	0	0	0	0	0
8. FO3 Villalobos, J E											0					1			1		1	1	0	1	0			0	1	1	0	0	1
9. FO2 Wanawan, A C											0						1		1		1	1	0	1	1			1	0	0	0	0	0
10. FO1 Leopoldo, R O											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	0			0	1	1	0	0	1
11. FO1 Perlas, JC B											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1			1	0	0	0	0	0
12. FO1 Damih, A P											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1			1	0	0	0	0	0
											0										0	0	0	0				0	0	0	0	0	0
											0										0	0	0	0				0	0	0	0	0	0
											0										0	0	0	0				0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL >>>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	3	1	3	12	0	12	12	0	12	9	0	0	9	3	3	0	0	3

Prepared by

FO1 Revi-Jun O Leopoldo
Crew

Certified Correct by

SFO3 Rupert V Bobadilla
Shift-in-Charge

Noted by

SFO4 Mark Daniel B Enriquez
Sub-Station Commander

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

Number of Serviceable Fire Boots FEMALE (sizes)												Total number of Serviceable Fire Boots (Male & Female)	Shortage Fire Boots			Shortage by Size (Pls. indicate the desired size for your shortage) MALE (sizes)												Sub Total	Shortage by Size (Pls. indicate the desired size for your shortage) FEMALE (sizes)											Sub Total	Total
5	5.5	6	6.5	7	7.5	8	8.5	9	9.5	10	Total		Male	Female	Total	7	7.5	8	8.5	9	9.5	10	10.5	11	11.5	12	12.5	13		5	5.5	6	6.5	7	7.5	8	8.5	9	9.5	10		
											M	N = L + M	O=I - L	P=J-M	Q = O + P													R													S	T= R + S
											0	1	0	0	0													0													0	0
											0	1	0	0	0													0													0	0
											0	1	0	0	0													0													0	0
											0	1	0	0	0													0													0	0
											0	1	0	0	0													0													0	0
											0	1	0	0	0													0													0	0
											0	1	0	0	0													0													0	0
											0	1	0	0	0													0													0	0
											0	1	0	0	0													0													0	0
											0	1	0	0	0													0													0	0
											0	1	0		0													0													0	0
											0	0	1	0	1					1									1													0	1
											0	0	0	0	0													0													0	0
											0	0	0	0	0													0													0	0
											0	0	0	0	0													0													0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION - NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
MANILA FIRE DISTRICT - STA. ANA FIRE SUB STATION
Pedro Gil St near Tejeron Sta. Ana, Manila
Tel.No. 5310-7667
Email add:staanafs@gmail.com

INVENTORY OF PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)
FIRE COAT and TROUSER
SAO Manila Fire District BFP-NCR
As of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-04

RHQ/Province/District City/Municipal Fire Station	NUMBER OF OPERATIONS PERSONNEL																						Total Number of Operations Personnel		
	OFFICERS						Total Number of				Total Number of Officers	NON-OFFICERS									Total of NOR				
												SFO				FO			Number of						
	CSUPT	SSUPT	SUPT	CINSP	SR INSP	INSP	CINSP to CSUPT	INSP to SINSP	Male	Female		4	3	2	1	3	2	1	Male	Female		Male	Female	Total
							A	B	C	D	E=A+B								F	G	H	I=C+F	J=D+G	K=I+J
1. SFO4 Enriquez, MD B											0		1								1	1	0	1
2. SFO3 Bobadilla, R V											0		1						1		1	1	0	1
3. SFO3 Erlanda, J M											0			1					1		1	1	0	1
4. SFO1 Cadiz, J B											0				1				1		1	1	0	1
5. SFO1 Gapuz, R L											0				1				1		1	1	0	1
6. FO3 Ty, M M											0					1			1		1	1	0	1
7. FO3 Umali, E O											0					1			1		1	1	0	1
8. FO3 Villalobos, J E											0					1			1		1	1	0	1
9. FO2 Wanawan, A C											0						1		1		1	1	0	1
10. FO1 Leopoldo, R O											0							1	1		1	1	0	1
11. FO1 Perlas, JC B											0							1	1		1			
12. FO1 Damih, A P											0							1	1		1	1	0	1
											0										0	0	0	0
											0										0	0	0	0
											0										0	0	0	0
TOTAL >>>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	3	1	3	11	0	12	11	0	11

Prepared by

FO1 Revi-Jun O Leopoldo
Crew

Certified Correct by

SFO3 Rupert V Bobadilla
Shift-In-Charge

Noted by

SFO4 Mark Daniel B Enriquez
Sub-Station Commander

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

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Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION - NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
MANILA FIRE DISTRICT - STA. ANA FIRE SUB STATION
Pedro Gil St near Tejeron Sta. Ana, Manila
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INVENTORY OF PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)
FIRE GLOVES
SAO MANILA FIRE DISTRICT BFP-NCR
As of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-02

RHQ/Province/District City/Municipal Fire Station	NUMBER OF OPERATIONS PERSONNEL																					Total Number of Operations Personnel			FIRE GLOVES Number of Serviceable Fire Gloves							Shortage of Fire Gloves	Shortage by Size (Pls. indicate the desired size for your Shortage)						
	OFFICERS					Total Number of				Total Number of Officers	NON-OFFICERS									Total of NOR					SIZE														
	CSUPT	SSUPT	SUPT	CINSP	SR INSP	INSP	CINSP to CSUPT	INSP to SINSP	Male	Female		SFO 4	SFO 3	SFO 2	SFO 1	FO 3	FO 2	FO 1	Number of Male	Number of Female		Male	Female	Total	XS	S	M	L	XL	XXL	Total		XS	S	M	L	XL	XXL	Total
							A	B	C	D	E=A+B								F	G	H	I=C+F	J=D+G	K=I+J							L	M=K-L							N
1. SFO4 Enriquez, MD B												1							1		1	1	0	1			1				1	0							
2. SFO3 Bobadilla, R V											0		1						1		1	1	0	1							0	1			1				1
3. SFO3 Erlanda, J M											0			1					1		1	1	0	1							0	1			1				1
4. SFO1 Cadiz, J B											0				1				1		1	1	0	1							0	1			1				1
5. SFO1 Gapuz, R L											0				1				1		1	1	0	1			1				1	0							
6. FO3 Ty, M M											0					1			1		1	1	0	1							0	1			1				1
7. FO3 Umali, E O											0					1			1		1	1	0	1							0	1			1				1
8. FO3 Villalobos, J E											0					1			1		1	1	0	1							0	1			1				1
9. FO2 Wanawan, A C											0						1		1		1	1	0	1							0	1			1				1
10. FO1 Leopoldo, R O											0							1	1		1	1	0	1							0	1			1				1
11. FO1 Perlas, JC B											0							1	1		1	1	0	1							0	1			1				1
12. FO1 Damih, A P											0							1	1		1	1	0	1							0	1			1				1
											0										0	0	0	0							0	0							0
											0										0	0	0	0							0	0							0
											0										0	0	0	0							0	0							0
TOTAL >>>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	3	1	3	12	0	12	12	0	12	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	10	0	0	10	0	0	0	10

Prepared by

FO1 Revi-Jun O Leopoldo
Crew

Certified Correct by

SFO3 Rupert V Bobadilla
Shift-In-Charge

Noted by

SFO4 Mark Daniel B Enriquez
Sub-Station Commander

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

Form No. LED-2017-04

FIRE COAT & TROUSER Number of Serviceable Fire Coat & Trouser									Total Number of Serviceable Fire Coat & Trouser	Shortage of Fire Coat & Trouser			Shortage by Size (Pls. indicate the desired size for your Shortage)									Total
MALE (sizes)					Total	FEMALE (sizes)		Total		Male	Female	Total	MALE (sizes)					Sub-Total	FEMALE (sizes)		Sub-Total	
S	M	L	XL	XXL		S	M						S	M	L	XL	XXL		S	M		
					L			M	N = sum(L & M)	O=I-L	P=J-M	Q = O+P						R			S	T=R+S
		1			1			0	1	0	0	0						0			0	0
		1			1			0	1	0	0	0						0			0	0
	1				1			0	1	0	0	0						0			0	0
			1		1			0	1	0	0	0						0			0	0
		1			1			0	1	0	0	0						0			0	0
		1			1			0	1	0	0	0						0			0	0
		1			1			0	1	0	0	0						0			0	0
		1			1			0	1	0	0	0						0			0	0
	1				1			0	1	0	0	0						0			0	0
	1				1			0	1			0						0			0	0
	1				1			0	1			0						0			0	0
	1				1			0	1	0		0						0			0	0
					0			0	0			0						0			0	0
					0			0	0			0						0			0	0
					0			0	0			0						0			0	0
0	5	6	1	0	12	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION - NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
MANILA FIRE DISTRICT - STA. ANA FIRE SUB STATION
Pedro Gil St near Tejeron Sta. Ana, Manila
Tel.No. 5310-7667
Email add:staanafs@gmail.com

INVENTORY OF FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT (FIRE HOSE)
REQUIREMENT DATA
SAO MANILA FIRE DISTRICT BFP-NCR
for the Month of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-07

RHQ/Province/District / City/Municipal / Fire Station	BFP OWNED FIRE ENGINES				FIRE HOSE					
					1½ size			2½ size		
	Serviceable	Unserviceable	Under Repair	TOTAL	Ideal No.	Number of Serviceable Fire Hose	SHORTAGE	Ideal No.	Number of Serviceable Fire Hose	SHORTAGE
	A	B	C	D= A+B+C	E =D X (20 Units)	F	G =E - F	E_1 =D X (4 Units)	F_1	G_1 =E_1 - F_1
MFD OFFICES				0	0		0	0		0
SRF				0	0		0	0		0
EMS				0	0		0	0		0
SAN NICOLAS				0	0		0	0		0
TANDUAY				0	0		0	0		0
PACO				0	0		0	0		0
INTRAMUROS				0	0		0	0		0
PANDACAN				0	0		0	0		0
TONDO				0	0		0	0		0
SAN LAZARO				0	0		0	0		0
STA MESA				0	0		0	0		0
GAGALANGIN				0	0		0	0		0
STA ANA	1	0	0	1	20	14	5	4	10	-6
ARROCEROS				0	0		0	0		0
SAMPALOC				0	0		0	0		0
MALACAÑANG				0	0		0	0		0
BACOOD				0	0		0	0		0
TOTAL >>>	1	0	0	1	20	14	5	4	10	-6

Prepared by:

FO1 Revi-Jun O Leopoldo
Crew

Certified correct:

SFO3 Rupert V Bobadilla
Shift-In-Charge

Noted by:

SFO4 Mark Daniel B Enriquez
Sub-Station Commander

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION - NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
MANILA FIRE DISTRICT - STA. ANA FIRE SUB STATION
Pedro Gil St near Tejeron Sta. Ana, Manila
Tel.No. 5310-7667
Email add:staanafs@gmail.com

INVENTORY OF SELF CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS (SCBA) REQUIREMENT DATA
SAO MANILA FIRE DISTRICT BFP-NCR
for the Month of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-06

RHQ/Province/District City/Municipal Fire Station	BFP OWNED FIRE ENGINES				Ideal No. of SCBA	SCBA	
	Serviceable	Unserviceable	Under Repair	TOTAL		Number of Serviceable SCBA	SHORTAGE
	A	B	C	D= A+B+C	E =D X (4 Units)	F	G =E - F
MFD OFFICES				0	0		0
SRF				0	0		0
EMS				0	0		0
SAN NICOLAS				0	0		0
TANDUAY				0	0		0
PACO				0	0		0
INTRAMUROS				0	0		0
PANDACAN				0	0		0
TONDO				0	0		0
SAN LAZARO				0	0		0
STA MESA				0	0		0
GAGALANGIN				0	0		0
STA ANA	1	0	0	1	4	2	2
ARROCEROS				0	0		0
SAMPALOC				0	0		0
MALACAÑANG				0	0		0
BACOOD				0	0		0
TOTAL >>>	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**4**	**2**	**2**

Prepared by:

FO1 Revi-Jun O Leopoldo
Crew

Certified correct:

SFO3 Rupert V Bobadilla
Shift-In-Charge

Noted by:

SFO4 Mark Daniel B Enriquez
Sub-Station Commander

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION - NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
MANILA FIRE DISTRICT - STA. ANA FIRE SUB STATION
Pedro Gil St near Tejeron Sta. Ana, Manila
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Email add:staanafs@gmail.com

INVENTORY OF PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)
FIRE COAT and TROUSER
SAO Manila Fire District BFP-NCR
As of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-04

RHQ/Province/District City/Municipal Fire Station	NUMBER OF OPERATIONS PERSONNEL																					Total Number of Operations Personnel		
	OFFICERS						Total Number of				Total Number of Officers	NON-OFFICERS									Total of NOR			
												SFO				FO			Number of					
	CSUPT	SSUPT	SUPT	CINSP	SR INSP	INSP	CINSP to CSUPT	INSP to SINSP	Male	Female		4	3	2	1	3	2	1	Male	Female		Male	Female	Total
							A	B	C	D	E=A+B								F	G	H	I=C+F	J=D+G	K=I+J
1. SFO4 Enriquez, MD B											0		1								1	1	0	1
2. SFO3 Bobadilla, R V											0		1						1		1	1	0	1
3. SFO3 Erlanda, J M											0			1					1		1	1	0	1
4. SFO1 Cadiz, J B											0				1				1		1	1	0	1
5. SFO1 Gapuz, R L											0				1				1		1	1	0	1
6. FO3 Ty, M M											0					1			1		1	1	0	1
7. FO3 Umali, E O											0					1			1		1	1	0	1
8. FO3 Villalobos, J E											0					1			1		1	1	0	1
9. FO2 Wanawan, A C											0						1		1		1	1	0	1
10. FO1 Leopoldo, R O											0							1	1		1	1	0	1
11. FO1 Perlas, JC B											0							1	1		1			
12. FO1 Damih, A P											0							1	1		1	1	0	1
											0										0	0	0	0
											0										0	0	0	0
											0										0	0	0	0
TOTAL >>>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	3	1	3	11	0	12	11	0	11

Prepared by

FO1 Revi-Jun O Leopoldo
Crew

Certified Correct by

SFO3 Rupert V Bobadilla
Shift-In-Charge

Noted by

SFO4 Mark Daniel B Enriquez
Sub-Station Commander

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

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Appendix C

Inventory of San Nicolas Fire Sub Station

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION
FIRE DISTRICT 1 - SAN NICOLAS FIRE SUB-STATION
296 Madrid St. corner San Fernando St. San Nicolas, Manila
Tel # (02) 7000-5887
Email add:sannicolasolp1@gmail.com

INVENTORY OF PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)
FIRE COAT and TROUSER
SAO Manila Fire District BFP-NCR
As of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-04

RHQ/Province/District City/Municipal Fire Station	NUMBER OF OPERATIONS PERSONNEL																					Total Number of Operations Personnel		
	OFFICERS						Total Number of				Total Number of Officers	NON-OFFICERS									Total of NOR			
												SFO				FO			Number of					
	CSUPT	SSUPT	SUPT	CINSP	SINSP	INSP	CINSP to CSUPT	INSP to SINSP	Male	Female		4	3	2	1	3	2	1	Male	Female		Male	Female	Total
							A	B	C	D	E=A+B								F	G	H	I=C+F	J=D+G	K=I+J
1. SFO4 Nicholas J Ochave											0	1							1		1	1		1
2. SFO2 Norman N Agayan											0			1					1		1	1		1
3. SFO2 Rogelio S Agustin Jr											0			1					1		1	1		1
4. SFO2 Rosito D Arboleda II											0			1					1		1	1		1
5. SFO2 Roderick M Andres											0			1					1		1	1		1
6. FO3 Rowelyn P Resurreccion											0					1				1	1		1	1
7. FO2 Clif Rhonsie V Mabalot											0						1		1		1	1		1
8. FO2 Ronnel D Dacumos											0						1		1		1	1		1
9. FO1 Raffy L Millan											0							1	1		1	1		1
10. FO1 Jeffrey P Novida											0							1	1		1	1		1
11. FO1 Andrew S Joseph											0							1	1		1	1		1
12. FO1 Roel N Dueñas											0							1	1		1	1		1
13. FO1 Ralph Albert M Cabbuag											0							1	1		1	1		1
14. FO1 Kyll B Medrano											0							1	1		1	1		1
15. FO1 John Daryl DC De Guzman (FBRC)											0							1	1		1	1		1
16. FO1 Valerie O Villareal (FBRC)											0							1		1	1		1	1
TOTAL >>>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	1	2	8	14	2	16	14	2	16

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION
FIRE DISTRICT 1 - SAN NICOLAS FIRE SUB-STATION
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Email add:sannicolasolp1@gmail.com

INVENTORY OF PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)
FIREMANS HOOD
SAO MANILA FIRE DISTRICT BFP-NCR
As of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-04

RHQ/Province/District City/Municipal Fire Station	NUMBER OF OPERATIONS PERSONNEL																				Total Number of Operations Personnel			FIREMAN'S HOOD	Shortage of Fireman's Hood
	OFFICERS						Total Number of					NON-OFFICERS													
												SFO				FO			Number of						
	CSUPT	SSUPT	SUPT	CINSP	SINSP	INSP	CINSP to CSUPT	INSP to SINSP	Male	Female	Total Number of Officers	4	3	2	1	3	2	1	Male	Female	Total of NOR	Male	Female	Total	Total number of Serviceable Fireman's Hood	
							A	B	C	D	E=A+B								F	G	H	I=C+F	J=D+G	K=I+J	L	M=K-L
1. SFO4 Nicholas J Ochave											0	1							1		1	1	0	1	1	0
2. SFO2 Norman N Agayan											0			1					1		1	1	0	1	1	0
3. SFO2 Rogelio S Agustin Jr											0			1					1		1	1	0	1	1	0
4. SFO2 Rosito D Arboleda II											0			1					1		1	1	0	1	1	0
5. SFO2 Roderick M Andres											0			1					1		1	1	0	1	1	0
6. FO3 Rowelyn P Resurreccion											0					1				1	1	0	1	1	0	1
7. FO2 Clif Rhonsie V Mabalot											0						1		1		1	1	0	1	1	0
8. FO2 Ronnel D Dacumos											0						1		1		1	1	0	1	1	0
9. FO1 Raffy L Millan											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1	0
10. FO1 Jeffrey P Novida											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1	0
11. FO1 Andrew S Joseph											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1	0
12. FO1 Roel N Dueñas											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1	0
13. FO1 Ralph Albert M Cabbuag											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1	0
14. FO1 Kyll B Medrano											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1	0
15. FO1 John Daryl DC De Guzman (FBRC)											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	0	1
16. FO1 Valerie O Villareal (FBRC)											0							1		1	1	0	1	1	0	1
TOTAL >>>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	1	2	8	14	2	16	14	2	16	13	3

Prepared by

FO1 Jeffrey P Novida
Crew

Certified Correct by

SFO2 Rogelio S Agustin Jr
Shift In-Charge

Noted by

SFO4 Nicholas J Ochave
Acting Sub-Station Commander

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION
FIRE DISTRICT 1 - SAN NICOLAS FIRE SUB-STATION
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INVENTORY OF PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)
FIRE BOOTS
SAO MANILA FIRE DISTRICT BFP-NCR
As of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-03

FIRE BOOTS

RHQ/Province/District City/Municipal Fire Station	NUMBER OF OPERATIONS PERSONNEL																					Total Number of Operations Personnel			Number of Serviceable Fire Boots MALE (sizes)													
	OFFICERS						Total Number of					NON-OFFICERS																										
												SFO			FO			Number of																				
	CSUPT	SSUPT	SUPT	CINSP	SINSP	INSP	CINSP to CSUPT	INSP to SINSP	Male	Female	Total Number of Officers	4	3	2	1	3	2	1	Male	Female	Total of NOR	Male	Female	Total	7	7.5	8	8.5	9	9.5	10	10.5	11	11.5	12	12.5	13	Total
							A	B	C	D	E=A+B								F	G	H	I=C+F	J=D+G	K=I+J														L
1. SFO4 Nicholas J Ochave											0	1							1		1	1	0	1					1									1
2. SFO2 Norman N Agayan											0			1					1		1	1	0	1						1								1
3. SFO2 Rogelio S Agustin Jr											0			1					1		1	1	0	1				1										1
4. SFO2 Rosito D Arboleda II											0			1					1		1	1	0	1						1								1
5. SFO2 Roderick M Andres											0			1					1		1	1	0	1						1								1
6. FO3 Rowelyn P Resurreccion											0					1				1	1	0	1	1														0
7. FO2 Clif Rhonsie V Mabalot											0						1		1		1	1	0	1				1										1
8. FO2 Ronnel D Dacumos											0						1		1		1	1	0	1														1
9. FO1 Raffy L Millan											0							1	1		1	1	0	1					1									1
10. FO1 Jeffrey P Novida											0							1	1		1	1	0	1						1								1
11. FO1 Andrew S Joseph											0							1	1		1	1	0	1				1										1
12. FO1 Roel N Dueñas											0							1	1		1	1	0	1					1									1
13. FO1 Ralph Albert M Cabbuag											0							1	1		1	1	0	1					1									1
14. FO1 Kyll B Medrano											0							1	1		1	1	0	1					1									1
15. FO1 John Daryl DC De Guzman (FBRC)											0							1		1	1	0	1	1														0
16. FO1 Valerie O Villareal (FBRC)											0																											
TOTAL >>>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	1	2	8	14	2	16	14	2	16	0	0	0	4	6	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION
FIRE DISTRICT 1 - SAN NICOLAS FIRE SUB-STATION
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INVENTORY OF PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)
FIRE HELMET
SAO MANILA FIRE DISTRICT BFP-NCR
As of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-01

RHQ/Province/District City/Municipal Fire Station	NUMBER OF OPERATIONS PERSONNEL																				Total Number of Operations Personnel			FIRE HELMET Number of Serviceable Fire Helmet				Shortage of Fire Helmet	Shortage By Color			
	OFFICERS										NON-OFFICERS													COLOR								
							Number of				SFO				FO		Number of															
	CSUPT	SSUPT	SUPT	CINSP	SINSP	INSP	CINSP to CSUPT	INSP to SINSP	Male	Female	Total Number of Officers	4	3	2	1	3	2	1	Male	Female	Total of NOR	Male	Female	Total	Yellow (NOR)	Red (INSP-SINSP)	White (CINSP-CSUPT)	Total		Yellow (NOR)	Red (INSP-SINSP)	White (CINSP-CSUPT)	Total
							A	B	C	D	E=A+B								F	G	H	I=C+F	J=D+G	K=I+J	L	M	N	O = SUM(L to	P=K-O	Q=H-L	R=B-M	S=A-N	T= sum(O
1. SFO4 Nicholas J Ochave											0	1							1		1	1	0	1	1			1					0
2. SFO2 Norman N Agayan											0			1					1		1	1	0	1	1			1					0
3. SFO2 Rogelio S Agustin Jr											0			1					1		1	1	0	1	1			1					0
4. SFO2 Rosito D Arboleda II											0			1					1		1	1	0	1	1			1					0
5. SFO2 Roderick M Andres											0			1					1		1	1	0	1	1			1					0
6. FO3 Rowelyn P Resurreccion											0					1				1	1	0	1	1				0	1	1			0
7. FO2 Clif Rhonsie V Mabalot											0						1		1		1	1	0	1	1			1					0
8. FO2 Ronnel D Dacumos											0						1		1		1	1	0	1	1			1					0
9. FO1 Raffy L Millan											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1			1					0
10. FO1 Jeffrey P Novida											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1			1					0
11. FO1 Andrew S Joseph											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1			1					0
12. FO1 Roel N Dueñas											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1			1					0
13. FO1 Ralph Albert M Cabbuag											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1			1					0
14. FO1 Kyll B Medrano											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1			1					0
15. FO1 John Daryl DC De Guzman (FBRC)											0							1	1		1	1	0	1	1			1					0
16. FO1 Valerie O Villareal (FBRC)											0							1		1	1	0	1	1				0	1	1			1
TOTAL >>>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	1	2	8	14	2	16	14	2	16	14	0	0	14	2	2	0	0	2

Prepared by

FO1 Jeffrey P Novida
Crew

Certified Correct by

SFO2 Rogelio S Agustin Jr
Shift In-Charge

Noted by

SFO4 Nicholas J Ochave
Acting Sub-Station Commander

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION
FIRE DISTRICT 1 - SAN NICOLAS FIRE SUB-STATION
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INVENTORY OF PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)
FIRE GLOVES
SAO MANILA FIRE DISTRICT BFP-NCR
As of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-02

RHQ/Province/District City/Municipal Fire Station	NUMBER OF OPERATIONS PERSONNEL																					Total Number of Operations Personnel			FIRE GLOVES Number of Serviceable Fire Gloves							Shortage of Fire Gloves	Shortage by Size (Pls. indicate the desired size for your Shortage)						
	OFFICERS						Total Number of				Total Number of Officers	NON-OFFICERS									Total of NOR				SIZE															
												SFO				FO			Number of																				
	CSUPT	SSUPT	SUPT	CINSP	SINSP	INSP	CINSP to CSUPT	INSP to SINSP	Male	Female		4	3	2	1	3	2	1	Male	Female		Male	Female	Total	XS	S	M	L	XL	XXL	Total		XS	S	M	L	XL	XXL	Total
							A	B	C	D	E=A+B								F	G	H	I=C+F	J=D+G	K=I+J							L	M=K-L							N
1. SFO4 Nicholas J Ochave											0	1									1	1		1				1			1								0
2. SFO2 Norman N Agayan											0			1					1		1	1		1							0	1				1			1
3. SFO2 Rogelio S Agustin Jr											0			1					1		1	1		1				1			1								0
4. SFO2 Rosito D Arboleda II											0			1					1		1	1		1				1			1								0
5. SFO2 Roderick M Andres											0			1					1		1	1		1							0	1				1			1
6. FO3 Rowelyn P Resurreccion											0					1				1	1		1	1							0	1			1				1
7. FO2 Clif Rhonsie V Mabalot											0						1		1		1	1		1				1			1								0
8. FO2 Ronnel D Dacumos											0						1		1		1	1		1				1			1								0
9. FO1 Raffy L Millan											0							1	1		1	1		1				1			1								0
10. FO1 Jeffrey P Novida											0							1	1		1	1		1				1			1								0
11. FO1 Andrew S Joseph											0							1	1		1	1		1							0	1				1			1
12. FO1 Roel N Dueñas											0							1	1		1	1		1				1			1								0
13. FO1 Ralph Albert M Cabbuag											0							1	1		1	1		1				1			1								0
14. FO1 Kyli B Medrano											0							1	1		1	1		1							0	1				1			1
15. FO1 John Daryl DC De Guzman (FBRC)											0							1		1	1		1	1							0	1			1				1
16. FO1 Valerie O Villareal (FBRC)											0																												
TOTAL >>>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	1	2	8	14	2	16	14	2	16	0	0	0	10	0	0	10	6	0	0	2	4	0	0	6

Prepared by

FO1 Jeffrey P Novida
Crew

Certified Correct by

SFO2 Rogelio S Agustin Jr
Shift In-Charge

Noted by

SFO4 Nicholas J Ochave
Acting Sub-Station Commander

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

Form No. LED-2017-04

FIRE COAT & TROUSER Number of Serviceable Fire Coat & Trouser									Total Number of Serviceable Fire Coat & Trouser	Shortage of Fire Coat & Trouser			Shortage by Size (Pls. indicate the desired size for your Shortage)									Total
MALE (sizes)					Total	FEMALE (sizes)		Total					MALE (sizes)					Sub-Total	FEMALE (sizes)		Sub-Total	
S	M	L	XL	XXL		S	M			Male	Female	Total	S	M	L	XL	XXL		S	M		
					L			M	N = sum(L & M)	O=I-L	P=J-M	Q = O+P						R			S	T=R+S
	1				1			0	1			0						0			0	0
	1				1			0	1			0						0			0	0
		1			1			0	1			0						0			0	0
	1				1			0	1			0						0			0	0
	1				1			0	1			0						0			0	0
					0			0	0		1	1								1		
			1		1			0	1			0						0			0	0
			1		1			0	1			0						0			0	0
	1				1			0	1			0						0			0	0
	1				1			0	1			0						0			0	0
	1				1			0	1			0						0			0	0
	1				1			0	1			0						0			0	0
		1			1			0	1			0						0			0	0
	1				1			0	1			0						0			0	0
	1				1			0	1			0						0			0	0
					0			0	0		1	1						0	1		1	1
0	10	2	2	0	14	0	0	0	14	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2

Prepared by:

FO1 Jeffrey P Novida
Crew

Certified Correct by:

SFO2 Rogelio S Agustin Jr
Shift In-Charge

Noted by:

SFO4 Nicholas J Ochave
Acting Sub-Station Commander

Number of Serviceable Fire Boots FEMALE (sizes)												Total number of Serviceable Fire Boots (Male & Female)	Shortage Fire Boots		
5	5.5	6	6.5	7	7.5	8	8.5	9	9.5	10	Total		Male	Female	Total
											M	N = L + M	O=I - L	P=J-M	Q = O
											0	1			0
											0	1			0
											0	1			0
											0	1			0
											0	1			0
											0	0		1	1
											0	1			0
											0	1			0
											0	1			0
											0	1			0
											0	1			0
											0	1			0
											0	1			0
											0	1			0
											0	1			0
											0	0		1	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	0	2	2

Shortage by Size																										Total
(Pls. indicate the desired size for your shortage) MALE (sizes)														(Pls. indicate the desired size for your shortage) FEMALE (sizes)												
7	7.5	8	8.5	9	9.5	10	10.5	11	11.5	12	12.5	13	Sub Total	5	5.5	6	6.5	7	7.5	8	8.5	9	9.5	10	Sub Total	
													R												S	T= R + S
													0												0	0
													0												0	0
													0												0	0
													0												0	0
													0												0	0
													0							1					1	1
													0												0	0
													0												0	0
													0												0	0
													0												0	0
													0												0	0
													0												0	0
													0												0	0
													0												0	0
													0												0	0
													0							1					1	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	2

Prepared by

FO1 Jeffrey P Novida
Crew

Certified Correct by

SFO2 Rogelio S Agustin Jr
Shift In-Charge

Noted by

SFO4 Nicholas J Ochave
Acting Sub-Station Commander

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION
FIRE DISTRICT 1 - SAN NICOLAS FIRE SUB-STATION
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INVENTORY OF FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT (FIRE HOSE)
REQUIREMENT DATA
SAO MANILA FIRE DISTRICT BFP-NCR
As of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-07

RHQ/Province/District	BFP OWNED FIRE ENGINES				FIRE HOSE					
City/Municipal					1½ size			2½ size		
Fire Station	Serviceable	Unserviceable	Under Repair	TOTAL	Ideal No.	Number of Serviceable Fire Hose	SHORTAGE	Ideal No.	Number of Serviceable Fire Hose	SHORTAGE
	A	B	C	D= A+B+C	E =D X (20 Units)	F	G =E - F	E_1 =D X (4 Units)	F_1	G_1 =E_1 - F_1
MFD OFFICES				0	0		0	0		0
SRF				0	0		0	0		0
EMS				0	0		0	0		0
SAN NICOLAS	1	0	0	1	20	40	-20	4	10	-6
TANDUAY				0	0		0	0		0
PACO				0	0		0	0		0
INTRAMUROS				0	0		0	0		0
PANDACAN				0	0		0	0		0
TONDO				0	0		0	0		0
SAN LAZARO				0	0		0	0		0
STA MESA				0	0		0	0		0
GAGALANGIN				0	0		0	0		0
STA ANA				0	0		0	0		0
ARROCEROS				0	0		0	0		0
SAMPALOC				0	0		0	0		0
MALACAÑANG				0	0		0	0		0
BACOOD				0	0		0	0		0
TOTAL >>>	1	0	0	1	20	40	-20	4	10	-6

Prepared by:

FO1 Jeffrey P Novida
Crew

Certified correct:

SFO2 Rogelio S Agustin Jr
Shift In-Charge

Noted by:

SFO4 Nicholas J Ochave
Acting Sub-Station Commander

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

Republic of the Philippines
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INVENTORY OF FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT (FIRE NOZZLE)
REQUIREMENT DATA
SAO MANILA FIRE DISTRICT BFP-NCR
As of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-08

RHQ/Province/District	BFP OWNED FIRE ENGINES				FIRE NOZZLE					
					1½ size			2½ size		
City/Municipal / Fire Station	Serviceable	Unserviceable	Under Repair	TOTAL	Ideal No.	Number of Serviceable Fire Nozzle		Ideal No.	Number of Serviceable Fire Nozzle	SHORTAGE
	A	B	C	D= A+B+C	E =D X (2 Units)	F	G = E - F	E_1 =D X (2 Units)	F_1	G_1 =E_1 -F_1
MFD OFFICES				0	0		0	0		0
SRF				0	0		0	0		0
EMS				0	0		0	0		0
SAN NICOLAS	1	0	0	1	2	4	-2	2	2	0
TANDUAY				0	0		0	0		0
PACO				0	0		0	0		0
INTRAMUROS				0	0		0	0		0
PANDACAN				0	0		0	0		0
TONDO				0	0		0	0		0
SAN LAZARO				0	0		0	0		0
STA MESA				0	0		0	0		0
GAGALANGIN				0	0		0	0		0
STA ANA				0	0		0	0		0
ARROCEROS				0	0		0	0		0
SAMPALOC				0	0		0	0		0
MALACAÑANG				0	0		0	0		0
BACOOD				0	0		0	0		0
TOTAL >>>	1	0	0	1	2	4	-2	2	2	0

Prepared by:

FO1 Jeffrey P Novida
Crew

Certified correct:

SFO2 Rogelio S Agustin Jr
Shift In-Charge

Noted by:

SFO4 Nicholas J Ochave
Acting Sub-Station Commander

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION
FIRE DISTRICT 1 - SAN NICOLAS FIRE SUB-STATION
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INVENTORY OF SELF CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS (SCBA)
REQUIREMENT DATA
SAO MANILA FIRE DISTRICT BFP-NCR
As of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-06

RHQ/Province/District	BFP OWNED FIRE ENGINES				Ideal No.	SCBA	
City/Municipal Fire Station	Serviceable	Unserviceable	Under Repair	TOTAL	of SCBA	Number of Serviceable SCBA	SHORTAGE
	A	B	C	D= A+B+C	E =D X (4 Units)	F	G =E - F
MFD OFFICES				0	0		0
SRF				0	0		0
EMS				0	0		0
SAN NICOLAS	1	0	0	1	4	4	0
TANDUAY				0	0		0
PACO				0	0		0
INTRAMUROS				0	0		0
PANDACAN				0	0		0
TONDO				0	0		0
SAN LAZARO				0	0		0
STA MESA				0	0		0
GAGALANGIN				0	0		0
STA ANA				0	0		0
ARROCEROS				0	0		0
SAMPALOC				0	0		0
MALACAÑANG				0	0		0
BACOOD				0	0		0
TOTAL >>>	1	0	0	1	4	4	0

Prepared by:

FO1 Jeffrey P Novida
Crew

Certified correct:

SFO2 Rogelio S Agustin Jr
Shift In-Charge

Noted by:

SFO4 Nicholas J Ochave
Acting Sub-Station Commander

BFP-QSF-ED-022 Rev. ØØ (01-17-19)

Appendix D

Inventory of Paco Fire Sub Station

INVENTORY OF SELF CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS (SCBA)
REQUIREMENT DATA
PACO FIRE SUB-STATION-MANILA FIRE DISTRICT
for the Month of DECEMBER 2025

Form No. LED-2017-06

RHQ/Province/District City/Municipal Fire Station	BFP OWNED FIRE ENGINES				Ideal No. of SCBA	SCBA	
	Serviceable	Unserviceable	Under Repair	TOTAL		Number of Serviceable SCBA	SHORTAGE
	A	B	C	D= A+B+C	E =D X (4 Units)	F	G =E - F
MFD OFFICES				0	0		0
SRF				0	0		0
EMS				0	0		0
SAN NICOLAS				0	0		0
TANDUAY				0	0		0
PACO	1	1		2	8	1	7
INTRAMUROS				0	0		0
PANDACAN				0	0		0
TONDO				0	0		0
SAN LAZARO				0	0		0
STA MESA				0	0		0
GAGALANGIN				0	0		0
STA ANA				0	0		0
ARROCEROS				0	0		0
SAMPALOC				0	0		0
MALACAÑANG				0	0		0
BACOOD				0	0		0
TOTAL >>>	1	1	0	2	8	1	7

INVENTORY OF SELF CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS (SCBA)
REQUIREMENT DATA
PACO FIRE SUB-STATION-MANILA FIRE DISTRICT
for the Month of DECEMBER 2025

m No. LED-2017-06

RHQ/Province/District	BFP OWNED FIRE ENGINES				Ideal No.	SCBA	
City/Municipal Fire Station	Serviceable	Unserviceable	Under Repair	TOTAL	of SCBA	Number of Serviceable SCBA	SHORTAGE
	A	B	C	D= A+B+C	E =D X (4 Units)	F	G =E - F
MFD OFFICES				0	0		0
SRF				0	0		0
EMS				0	0		0
SAN NICOLAS				0	0		0
TANDUAY				0	0		0
PACO	1	1		2	8	1	7
INTRAMUROS				0	0		0
PANDACAN				0	0		0
TONDO				0	0		0
SAN LAZARO				0	0		0
STA MESA				0	0		0
GAGALANGIN				0	0		0
STA ANA				0	0		0
ARROCEROS				0	0		0
SAMPALOC				0	0		0
MALACAÑANG				0	0		0
BACOOD				0	0		0
TOTAL >>>	1	1	0	2	8	1	7

Form No. LED-2017-04

FIRE COAT & TROUSER Number of Serviceable Fire Coat & Trouser									Total Number of Serviceable Fire Coat & Trouser	Shortage of Fire Coat & Trouser			Shortage by Size (Pls. indicate the desired size for your Shortage)									Total
MALE (sizes)					Total	FEMALE (sizes)		Total		Male	Female	Total	MALE (sizes)					Sub-Total	FEMALE (sizes)		Sub-Total	
S	M	L	XL	XXL		S	M						S	M	L	XL	XXL		S	M		
					L			M	N = sum(L & M)	O=I-L	P=J-M	Q = O+P						R			S	T=R+S
		1			1			0	1			0						0			0	0
					0	1		1	1			0						0			0	0
		1			1			0	1			0						0			0	0
		1			1			0	1			0						0			0	0
		1			1			0	1			0						0			0	0
		1			1			0	1			0						0			0	0
		1			1			0	1			0						0			0	0
					0	1		1	1			0						0			0	0
					0		1	1	1			0						0			0	0
		1			1			0	1			0						0			0	0
		1			1			0	1			0						0			0	0
					0			0	0			0						0			0	0
					0			0	0			0						0			0	0
0	0	8	0	0	8	2	1	3	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Appendix E

I. For RQ1: Respective responses of the four interview participants in Paco Fire Sub Station and two interview participants from Ermita Volunteer Fire Station:

- Interviewee Demographics:
  - Interviewee 1 (BFP): FO1 Christian Tabago - 5 years in service, Criminology Graduate, got inspired during BFP OJT to help in rescue operations, rotating duty in Paco and Intramuros stations. Role: crew of fire truck in Paco and tactical officer of trainees in Intramuros.
  - Interviewee 2 (BFP): Bernard Duyan, Chief In Charge, Fire Officer 1 of Paco Sub Station, Criminology graduate who was not accepted in PNP, but now happy with work as a fireman.
  - Interviewee 3 (BFP): John Paulo Tejada, 8 years in service, not accepted in PNP so applied in BFP, Fire Truck driver and Pump Operator, Fire Officer 2 in Paco Fire Sub Station.
  - Interviewee 4 (BFP): John Marie Bolanon, Fire Officer 1 in Paco Fire Sub station, 5 years in service, Criminology graduate who liked the nature of work in BFP as a former intern, role is engine crew and public information officer.
  - Interviewee 5 (Volunteer): Johnny Pagaling, Team Leader and Senior Firefighter in Ermita Malate Fire and Rescue Volunteer, 30

years in service, became a volunteer after witnessing a critical fire in his community that killed four children and an elderly.

- Interviewee 6 (Volunteer): William Kenji Lim. Driver Pump Operator but also serves as a firefighter if needed, 5 years in service, comes from a family involved in fire volunteerism with his father and uncles being former directors who worked with volunteer organizations. He became a volunteer to continue his family's legacy.

- As to whether they completed the standard training: (BFP NFTI Fire Basic Recruit Course):

  BFPs: Yes.

  Volunteers: Interviewee 5 did not complete the BFP NFTI Fire Basic Recruit Course but has a Certificate of Competency (COC) issued by the BFP. Interviewee 6 completed the training.

- As to what year they completed the training:

  BFPs: In 2022, 2013, 2019, and 2022 respectively.

  Volunteers: Interviewee 6 completed the training in 2021.

- Other training they went through to be a firefighter if they did not go through NFTI's Fire Basic Recruit Course:

  BFPs: N/A

  Volunteers: Interviewee 5 did not mention any other training while Interviewee 6 underwent training in Taiwan in 2024.

- As to whether they responded to any critical fire incidents in the past 6 months:

  BFPs: Yes.

  Volunteers: Both said yes but Interviewee 6 has only responded as a DPO for the past 6 months.

- If yes, approximately how many incidents they responded to:

  BFPs:

  - Interviewee 1: None, because he was assigned as tactical officer in Intramuros.
  - 20, 30, and 20 respectively for interviewees 2, 3, and 4.

  Volunteers:

  - Interviewee 5: About 30 critical fire incidents
  - Interviewee 6: For the past 6 months, none as a firefighter

- On describing a recent critical fire incident they responded to where they felt that their training directly helped them do their job effectively and how training specifically helped them in that moment:

  BFPs:

  - In two simultaneous fire incidents in Tondo and Parola responded by Team Alpha and Team Bravo, their training that developed their physical endurance and body strength helped them endure the fire incident that lasted for more than 24 hours.
  - During actual fire incidents, the Chief In Charge has been able to effectively do "size up" as taught in training. This pertains to

observing the fire situation first and ensuring that it is safe for the team to enter the scene before responding.

- Training has helped them build confidence in responding to fire incidents.
- Training prepared them well physically especially in responding to fires in high rise buildings where they need to go up and down multiple stairs.

Volunteers:

- In responding to a fire in Liberiza, Interviewee 5 recounted how crucial their safety protocol training was. He highlighted the importance of how to read smoke movement as the fire they responded to involved a wooden house and collapsing structures where they needed to rely on their training to determine where it was safe to enter and access the fire. The interviewee also emphasized how discipline and knowing to prioritize safety along with proper use of equipment plays a huge part in response operations.
- Interviewee 6 recalled a fire incident in Binondo about a year ago wherein they had to use Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA). The training they had where conditions during critical fire incidents were simulated (zero visibility using a fog machine) really helped because during the actual fire scene, they really cannot see anything while responding. He also mentioned that

EMS training and basic life support are aspects of their training that was useful both on and off the field.

- Both interviewees felt that knowing their training well made them feel secure and confident in responding to critical fire incidents.

- The aspects of the training conducted by the BFP which they think were the most applicable during actual response operations:

  BFPs:

  - The Firefighting Operation training, which teaches proper techniques in putting off fires through water hose, and proper strategies on which areas to focus more during the incident to avoid unnecessary object damages.
  - The Rescue module: doing first aid such as performing CPR, and proper carrying of victims so as to not add to the injury of the fire victims.
  - The part that teaches them to ensure their safety first, such as wearing their complete PPE before responding to a fire incident.
  - Strengthening the body so that they will not be the ones to be rescued during fire incidents
  - As for the fire truck driver, what he learned from the training is how the truck should be driven to the fire incident area and how he must bring fellow firemen there without incurring any accident along the way.

- Almost all training modules like those on Firefighting Operations, Medical, and Rescue are applicable in actual fire situations.

Volunteers:

- Both volunteers said that their discipline and safety training were the most important because they knew how to keep themselves and their colleagues safe while trying to save other lives. This knowledge taught them how to approach critical fire incidents without rushing in recklessly. Some of the skills that helped them in their response were knowing how to identify entry points and assessing the fire scene helped them make informed decisions in order to put out the fire successfully.
- For Interviewee 6, EMS training was really helpful noting that it is "nonsense of being a firefighter if you don't know how to do basic life support or first aid".

- How they felt in terms of confidence or preparedness in applying these skills from training while under immense pressure during critical fire incidents:

BFPs:

- It somehow gave them a sense of happiness to be able to help in rescue operations during fire incidents and to recall that certain parts of the training as stated above helped them to do so.
- They have fear when responding to fire incidents in squatter areas with rowdy crowds who pressure them to put off fire first on their

respective houses; and they have fear for their lives since they have families that they do not want to leave behind.

- They are confident in applying the Rescue and Fire Operations skills they acquired from training during actual fire operations.
- Confidence level is high (e.g. level 8 to 10); however, there are still lapses in applying acquired skills from training in actual fire incidents. Heavy traffic and some uncooperative volunteer groups could cause some ineffectiveness in responding to fire incidents.
- Confidence in responding to actual critical fire incidents based on learnings from training is not full since scenarios mentioned in the training are quite different from actual fire situations. Being able to work with seasoned firefighters has been the thing that gave them more confidence in responding to critical fire incidents.

Volunteers:

- Knowing what to do and having the right equipment made them feel very confident to apply their learnings from their training and respond to critical fire incidents. They felt that the training provided them with ample knowledge and skills to allow them to do their jobs effectively during operations. However, there are instances where training felt lacking especially when it involved tackling hazardous materials inside burning buildings.

- As to whether there are any moments wherein they felt that their training did not prepare them enough for their job on the field, and why:

BFPs:

- None, as far as they think. With the length of the training, it was able to teach all that they needed for their job.
- Yes, there were times when they could not fully apply their learnings from training due to insufficient equipment (e.g. lacking enough supply of SCBA; insufficient equipment for forcible entry; no thermal scanners; and insufficient personnel where instead of focusing on firefighting only, one also has to do water refilling and preparing hoses.)

Volunteers:

- Interviewee 5 admitted that training did not really feel enough for some realities that they experience on the field. One of these realities deals with hidden risks inside burning structures like gas tanks and chemicals. He shared that there are things you can't really identify which the training unfortunately did not prepare them enough for it. He also mentioned that training using more advanced techniques were not available which could've helped them respond to those situations.
- For Interviewee 6, he felt like there wasn't enough training with regards to physical fitness. Although he says that his own discipline plays a part in it, he still feels like their training isn't enough.

- Another thing he found that wasn't enough is the training for more specialized scenarios like those that involve car extrications. BFP is not capable of teaching these in training due to lack of resources. He was only able to learn how to handle such situations because of an international training in Taiwan he attended.

- As to how they were able to handle it despite feeling unprepared:

  Volunteers:

  - Despite feeling unprepared, they relied on their own experiences and judgment to get the job done. They focused on things that they know and that they could do in order to put out the fire.

- Which skills or learnings from their training they think are essential to know during critical fire incidents:

  BFPs:

  - Skills training helps develop the abilities needed to cope effectively with actual fire operations, such as proper hose carrying techniques and correct positioning at the fire scene.
  - 'Size-up,' as taught in training, pertains to observing the fire situation first and assessing the risk factors at the scene (e.g., fire behavior, presence of explosives) to ensure that it is safe for the team to enter before responding. In this way, the safety of the firefighters is also prioritized.
  - Among the modules in the four-month training—Firefighting Operations, Medical, Rescue, and Prevention—the most applicable

for those assigned as sub-station officers is Firefighting Operations.

Volunteers:

- Knowing where and how to prevent loss is crucial in responding to critical fire incidents. An important lesson from training is prioritizing safety at the fire scene for the responders and everyone else involved.
- It is important to focus your efforts and resources on where you can still save other people. Interviewee 5 states an example that if there is something burning and nothing can be done, focus instead on what is still salvageable so efforts and resources are not wasted.

- Their recommendations in improving the training that they receive as firefighters:

  BFPs:

  - There is a need to upgrade their equipment, such as their old fire truck, which often malfunctions and slows down their work during fire incidents.
  - There is a need to add more SCBAs to the existing two units. This will enable more personnel to respond during fire incidents.
  - Additional firetrucks and PPEs would help.
  - A refresher training course is needed for those who completed their training many years ago, to help them recall parts of the training

that may have been forgotten and to refresh their knowledge and skills in firefighting.

- All BFP trainers are dedicated and skilled. However, the facilities used during training, as well as the equipment used in actual operations—such as firetrucks—need to be modernized, as the existing units are old and have many defects. Training in the field is also affected by the lack of sufficient equipment and manpower. For example, instead of focusing solely on firefighting, personnel also have to handle tasks such as hose preparation and water refilling.
- There is a need to increase the number of training personnel so that more trainees can be accommodated.
- It is implied that on-field exposure should be allowed during training, especially for those who have no previous OJT experience prior to the training.

Volunteers:

- Attending every available training is a must so that you can continue to learn and gain skills on how to be effective in putting out fires.
- There is a need for more advanced and updated techniques using better equipment and resources to help them respond to specific scenarios like dealing with hazardous materials.

    - Additional training that are not covered by the BFP and are only offered outside of the country like those tackling car extrications or mass casualties.
    - More training with heavy equipment for rescuing people during large-scale critical fire incidents.
- On how they would overall describe the role that their training and experience played in preparing them to effectively respond to critical fire incidents:
    - Training strengthened their mind and body, helping them avoid panic and remain resilient during fire incidents.
    - The work of a fireman is very difficult, as they are exposed to intense heat for hours and often get wet in the process.
    - The training provided them with skills and knowledge, most of which are applicable in actual fire situations.
    - The training provided them with useful SOPs for firefighting and rescue operations.

Volunteers:

- Training is essential and provides the necessary skills and knowledge to help them do their jobs effectively.
- Experience on applying the training on the field helped them have the confidence and adaptability to respond to critical fire incidents.

II. For RQ2: The respective responses of the FGD participants Paco Fire Sub Station, Santa Ana Fire Station, San Nicolas Fire Station, and Ermita Malate Fire and Rescue Volunteer:

- As to description of a recent critical fire incident they responded to where they couldn't fully apply their training:

  Paco: There was one fire incident in Tondo, where they could not apply learnings from training because the area was congested, people were panicking and trying to grab the hose because their houses were on fire. There were no fire hydrants in their area so they ran out of water and supply. They would only come every 5-10 minutes so people thought they weren't doing their jobs. Someone was using a gun and others were throwing rocks at the firetrucks of volunteers and even provoking them so they were asked by their higher ups to leave the scene for safety since they did not have self-defense equipment or training.

  Santa Ana: They could not immediately apply their training and decide to go and save a person because they have a protocol where they have to wait for the go-signal of a higher up.

  San Nicolas: They recounted a critical fire in August 2023 at Carvajal, where they were unable to fully follow standard procedures due to equipment shortages, delayed notifications, narrow roads, and crowded streets. These organizational factors prevented proper size-up, use of SCBAs, and initial rescue operations. Despite these challenges, they proceeded with firefighting operations, successfully extinguishing the fire,

but the incident resulted in 11 casualties and highlighted the high-risk consequences of missed protocols.

Volunteers: They could not apply crowd control which they learned from training because during actual fire incidents, they are focused on firefighting.

- As to what happened:

  Paco & Santa Ana: Same as above.

  San Nicolas: In August 2023, a fire broke out at Carvajal. Firefighters arrived after the fire had been burning for 10–15 minutes, with narrow roads and crowded streets complicating access. The fire had already escalated into a conflagration, and equipment like SCBAs was unavailable. Unable to follow standard procedures, they proceeded directly to firefighting. The fire was eventually extinguished, but there were 11 casualties.

  Volunteers: When the head of BFP stations order the volunteers not to enter the fire scene, they are not able to apply in such situations their learnings from training. In such cases, they just help by providing water and equipment, and doing crowd control.

- As to what they did in order to address those factors:

  Paco: Application of maximum tolerance and waiting for people to calm down before going back to the scene.

  Santa Ana: They give suggestions to their higher ups, who then gives the suggestion to the main decision maker in the scene.

San Nicolas: Despite delayed notification, equipment shortages, and chaotic conditions, firefighters proceeded with the firefighting operations. They adapted by skipping the initial protocol steps, entering the building as safely as possible without SCBAs, and focusing on extinguishing the fire. Their actions ultimately put out the fire, although the incident resulted in 11 casualties.

Volunteers: When they do not get to apply their training properly, the volunteer fire brigade provides debriefing or a refresher course after the fire incident.

- As to organizational barriers (such as equipment, procedures, protocols, or environmental factors) which made it difficult for them to use what they've learned from training:

  Paco:

  - Having not enough supply of radio makes it difficult for them to communicate with fellow firemen during fire incidents, especially when fire is in high rise buildings. They have only one radio held by their Chief-In-Charge. For instance, relaying the need for more water or the need to put off the water supply, at times, become difficult.
  - Lack of enough SCBAs (self-contained breathing apparatus). The ratio is one is to two users or sometimes one is to six users. There is also not enough oxygen refill

and masks are blurry thus making it difficult for them to effectively respond to smoky fire situations.

- Lack of enough security for crowd control, especially when those whose houses are on fire try to grab the hose and harass the firemen. This prevents the firemen from doing the "size-up" protocol which they learned from training.
- Fire scenarios used in training are different from actual fire incidents like the amount of heat and smoke encountered by the firemen are much more intense in actual situations.
- While training is more on physical conditioning and lecture, actual fire situations would involve pressure from the crowd, structural risks like falling debris and blocks, risks from burning chemicals, presence of obstructions in their pathway.
- The five-minute response time learned from training is not always applicable because of factors like obstructions in the pathway, traffic, and uncontrolled crowd.
- At times, they find it difficult to apply "engine-relay", which they learned from training, because of having different groups of volunteers also responding to the fire incident. These volunteers have different protocols and are strangers to them; therefore, they do not automatically share their water supply with the BFP.

Santa Ana: Lack of enough SCBAs hinder them from applying their training effectively.

San Nicolas: Firefighters identified several organizational and environmental barriers that hinder the application of training, including overcrowded streets, interference from bystanders, traffic congestion, low-hanging wires, and double-parked vehicles. These factors complicate maneuvering, positioning of equipment, and timely response during fire operations.

Volunteers:

- Time hinders them from fully applying their learnings from training because they are just volunteers and have their respective regular work other than being firefighters.
- They mentioned that they lacked training on high angle rope rescue and water rescue.

- On what policies/procedures which they think need more practical application:

Santa Ana: Training is already strong and contextualized and applicable during fire incidents; they just need to work on implementation and refresher training on lessons such as the 10 phases of firefighting.

San Nicolas: Firefighters explained that formal policies and protocols are mainly applied during training and fire prevention, not during actual firefighting, since each fire situation is unique. They emphasized the need for regular practical exercises at the station to maintain skills such as

ladder use, hose handling, and operating breathing apparatus, ensuring readiness for real incidents.

Volunteers: Observing discipline during actual fire incidents. For example, following the orders of higher authorities during fire situations.

- Procedures they wished could have been contextualized more during the training given the reality of the incidents they responded to:

  Paco: The five-minute response time should be contextualized considering actual obstructions during fire incidents like heavy traffic, narrow pathways, and failure of the civilians to report the incident on time due to them prioritizing their social media posts.

  Santa Ana: None. They think the training is enough.

  San Nicolas: Firefighters noted that Philippine firefighting training follows international standards, but the lack of SCBAs, refilling stations, realistic training grounds, and practice buildings limits contextualized, field-relevant training. They highlighted that these resource constraints prevent fully applying training to real-life scenarios.

- Other barriers that were not mentioned that make it hard for them to apply their skills gained from training:

  Paco: Hydrants that lack water, malfunction, are far, are obstructed, covered or damaged by civilians make it hard for them to apply "continuous fire extinguishing" as taught in training.

  Santa Ana: The mental toll it takes being away from their families for a long time and stress from continuous fire incidents.

San Nicolas: No additional barriers affect the application of their training. Guidance from the Station-in-Charge helps them perform effectively.

Volunteers: Different groups of volunteers have different systems in firefighting operations.

- How leadership and team communication affect how they respond to a fire incident in the field:

  Santa Ana:

  - Teamwork is very important in their field of work. They should know how to listen and follow instructions. They must know how to estimate and have decision making skills, and trust in each other is very important. Simple instructions could save their lives, and they believe that following each others' instructions is for their own good.
  - When it comes to leadership, whenever they think of an idea, they let their chief-in-command or whoever the main decision maker is in the fire scene know. If they have ideas, they consult with them. It is also better when they all contribute because there are things that their main decision makers cannot see that they can.

  San Nicolas: Leadership and communication are critical during responses. Tasks and positions are assigned by the ground commander (usually the SIC–Site Incident Controller or another officer) and command is handed over to higher-ranking officers when they arrive, ensuring coordinated action during fire incidents.

Volunteers:

- The chain of command follows the fire chief, then the deputy, and then the OIC. Volunteer firefighters respond only to the person in charge at the scene.
- They have an effective team communication system where it is their OIC who gives them instructions and delegates tasks during firefighting operations.

- On an instance where communication was the main hindrance:

  Santa Ana: When they have ideas, but their higher up has another idea. There are also instances where instructions from another higher authority do not get to them.

  San Nicolas: There are times when communication breaks down during a response. For example, in high-rise buildings, there is no signal, so the SIC (Site Incident Controller) cannot communicate with the responding personnel.

  Volunteers:

  - The radios they use are not waterproof, so they switch them off when exposed to water during firefighting, which makes communication difficult.
  - The noisy, panicking crowd makes it difficult for them to communicate with each other during fire incidents.
  - In large fire incidents involving multiple stations and volunteer groups, the orders and actions of these groups are often not

synchronized. As a result, firetrucks from the same group sometimes become separated, making it difficult to determine which truck responded first and which one should be supplied with water.

    - At times, they find it difficult to communicate because high-risk situations at the scene require them to prioritize their safety. Instead of holding the radio to communicate, they must hold onto stable objects while putting out the fire.
    - Another difficulty arises when their buddy, who is supposed to handle radio communication, is unable to do so because he must prioritize rescue operations.

- On how their teamwork can be improved:

  Paco: Their teamwork is good since each has his designated job (e.g. nozzleman, driver, etc.) which makes it automatic for them to do their job with coordination. The Officer-in-Charge (OIC) is the one doing the sizing up and gives the next instructions. They are like brothers who reside in a common barracks in the fire station so they are familiar with each other. In case of any misunderstanding among them, their unit head immediately resolves it. They also implement a buddy-system when responding to fire incidents.

  Santa Ana:

    - Team building would strengthen their closeness and brotherhood, their care for each other, their companionship.

- It is also a challenge for them when their teammates get transferred, or they gain another new team member that they have to adjust to.

San Nicolas: They emphasized that strong teamwork is built on a "family-like" culture. Respect for ranks, personalities, and hierarchy, along with maintaining brotherhood and mutual support at the station, is crucial for effective collaboration both during operations and daily routines.

Volunteers:

- They improve their teamwork through team-building sessions organized by their higher officers. They also hold informal gatherings, such as Sunday lunches, which help strengthen their workplace chemistry.
- In case of misunderstandings, they address the issue promptly before it escalates.
- If there is miscommunication during fire incidents, they hold a post-operation debriefing to resolve the matter and improve coordination for future operations.

- On how bystanders interfering with them affect the way they respond to a fire incident in the field, especially a critical one:

Santa Ana:

- Bystanders are not always helpful. Some take advantage of the situation by committing burglary, yet firefighters are blamed for it.

Other bystanders call firefighters and mislead them away from the actual fire scene to their own houses, causing a waste of time.

- Some bystanders take firefighters' hoses in an attempt to save their own houses first, interfering with the firefighters' work.
- Some harass the firefighters by stabbing them or throwing objects at them.
- Not all bystanders are bad, there are those who help and make it easier for the firefighters to do their jobs.

San Nicolas: Bystander interference (such as people grabbing hoses to try to extinguish the fire themselves) hinders their operations and complicates firefighting efforts in critical situations.

Volunteers: Bystanders interfere by causing traffic, which slows down their response to fire incidents. The problem is worsened by the lack of police reinforcements for crowd control.

- On how training could better equip them to respond to bystanders:

Paco: Formal training did not teach them to deal effectively with troublesome bystanders. It has been their senior and seasoned firemen who taught them techniques which are applying patience and professionalism in dealing with such bystanders (e.g. not giving up to their provocation, just ignoring them, and continuing doing their job).

Santa Ana: They currently go to barangays and do seminars and training/awareness campaigns for civilians to know what their jobs are. They explain many misconceptions about their job.

San Nicolas: Training could include strategies for managing bystanders, emphasizing coordination with the police to secure the scene. During operations, police are called in to control crowds, allowing firefighters to focus on extinguishing the fire safely.

Volunteers:

- The training taught them that when crowd control is needed to prevent interference with firefighting operations, they must report it to the incident commander, who will then request assistance from the police for crowd management.
- The volunteers share what they have learned from their training with the community to help residents become more aware and cooperative during firefighting operations.

- On what changes in training, procedures, or management they think could help them apply your training to actual fire incidents more effectively:

Paco:

- Contextualize the five-minute required response time based on actual hurdles like traffic, obstruction in the pathway, and narrow roads.
- They suggest that the training unit use modern equipment and materials in simulating responding to fire incidents.
- They suggest adding modules on WASAR (water search and rescue) under Rescue Operations since in actuality, they encounter

fire incidents in flooded areas and they are not equipped with WASAR skills.

- They suggest adding modules on dealing with HazMat (Hazardous Materials) during fire incidents (e.g. dealing with explosives in fire-stricken areas)

Santa Ana: Add training centers and facilities (e.g. houses that may be burnt down for simulation) because they are lacking.

San Nicolas: No changes are currently needed, as their standard training is sufficient for their current roles. They noted that only promotion to higher ranks might require additional training or procedural updates.

Volunteers: Although they undergo a uniform standard training program, different volunteer groups have their own ways of applying what they learned. It would be better if the manner in which they apply their training in actual situations were also standardized.

III. For RQ3: The respective responses of the FGD participants Paco Fire Sub Station, Santa Ana Fire Station, San Nicolas Fire Station, and Ermita Malate Fire and Rescue Volunteer:

- On specific equipment/facilities shortages they encounter during firefighting situations:

Paco: Same as stated above.

Santa Ana:

- They lack SCBAs (they only have 2 when there are 7 of them) and they share it with each other which is unhygienic.

- They also lack some equipment in the firetrucks such as the one they call “snorkel”--a fire truck with a boom that’s meant for smaller areas and can maneuver through overhead wires to rescue people.
- They have worn-out PPEs. Some newer personnel even inherit the worn-out equipment of senior members.

San Nicolas: Significant shortages in essential equipment, including ladders capable of reaching high floors, worn-out PPE, limited SCBAs with no refilling or maintenance facilities, and the absence of advanced technologies like thermal imaging and motion detectors. These deficiencies complicate firefighting operations, especially in high-rise or prolonged incidents.

Volunteers:

- Narrow pathways hinder them from bringing in the firetruck and its water supply needed to extinguish the fire. They also face challenges such as insufficient hoses and a lack of functional hydrants, as some hydrants are damaged, stolen, or too few in number.
- They lack adequate training facilities and are often forced to go to other provinces just to undergo their firefighting training.
- They have an adequate supply of PPEs and SCBAs; however, maintenance is costly and infrequent, and there is not enough budget for refillants (cylinder tanks) for the SCBAs.

- Their coping techniques to still be able to perform their job as firefighters with these shortages:

  Paco:

  - They apply DIY (Do-it-Yourself) and improvise. For example, to cope with the lack of SCBA, they use wet towels/handkerchiefs to cover their noses and mouths during fire incidents. They also make do with old PPEs by washing them to reuse them. For the damaged boots, they have it vulcanized.
  - They buy materials like flashlights, face masks, gloves, and boots with their own money.

  Santa Ana:

  - They use good morning towels to cover their noses and mouths during fire incidents, to cope with the lack of SCBAs.
  - As for the lack of firetrucks with a boom, they do manual climbing up with ladders.
  - As for the worn-out equipment, they buy their own boots from Japan Surplus stores–which were supposed to be provided by the government

  San Nicolas: Despite equipment shortages, firefighters adapt by using improvised and makeshift methods to continue operations. When SCBAs are unavailable, they use wet towels for basic smoke protection; when proper tools are lacking, they substitute available equipment like axes; and when access is limited, they improvise physical solutions such as stacking

objects to reach higher areas. These strategies reflect resourcefulness and flexibility developed to sustain firefighting efforts despite material constraints.

Volunteers:

- They shoulder the cost of SCBA refills, which they obtain from scuba-diving facilities. They also do their best to take care of the equipment to prolong its lifespan, and they use discounts when having the cylinder tanks serviced.
- For lack of water supply from hydrants, they use very long hoses and draw supply from nearby bodies of water, such as rivers or creeks.

- Whether or not they think these coping or adaptive techniques are enough to be able to effectively carry out their jobs during fire incidents:

  Paco: For them, their mentioned coping/adaptive techniques are not enough to be able to effectively carry out their jobs during fire incidents; however, they have no choice but to continue doing those techniques for their own safety.

  Santa Ana: It may be enough for the strong-hearted, but not for ordinary people. Ultimately, firefighters have learned to adapt to the lack of equipment. Some are not even accustomed to using SCBAs and, in fact, are more used to inhaling smoke and entering without any breathing apparatus. This is partly because breathing apparatus have limited operating time; once the supply runs out, they must exit. Others, regardless

of the risk, still go in without any equipment. There are situations in which firefighters are forced to enter despite these conditions. However, there are moments when they can no longer endure it—those are the times when proper equipment becomes truly necessary.

San Nicolas: The firefighters believe these improvised techniques are not sufficient for effective and safe fire response. While they allow operations to continue, they pose long-term health risks, particularly from smoke exposure. They emphasized the need for modernization and standardized equipment to ensure safer and more effective firefighting in the future.

Volunteers: For them, they think that their coping techniques are not enough; however, they continue to do them in order to help others.

- On their recommendations, with respect to shortages on equipment/facilities, to be able to effectively carry out your job during fire incidents:

  Paco:

  - They suggest having enough SCBAs which ideally should be one SCBA per fireman for their safety and more effective responding to fire incidents.
  - Add more radios for effective communication among firemen during fire incidents.
  - Add more PPEs for their safety (e.g. replacement of damaged boots so they do not have to have it vulcanized, replacement of old helmets, and have at least one complete set of PPE per personnel)

- Add more functional fire hydrants.
- Have enough budget for the shortages to be addressed
- They hope that the government will be able to notice such shortages/concerns
- They hope that their automechanic for their trucks and service be given enough equipment for effective repairs of their vehicles

Santa Ana:

- Procure the said lacking equipment.
- Implement the existing plans on replenishing or replacing the equipment (which everyone is already aware of since they keep track of how many are still usable and how many are already damaged).
- Provide PPEs and replace them when they break down.
- It would be better if there were a system—whether every three years or every five years—where the equipment issued to them is replaced with a new one after that period. It would motivate them more.

San Nicolas: They recommended ensuring the availability of complete and high-quality equipment to improve firefighting operations. They emphasized that adequate, well-funded equipment directly enhances performance and safety, given the highly hazardous nature of their work, and helps reduce long-term health risks from repeated fire exposure.

Volunteers:

- They suggest increasing community awareness about the need to keep pathways clear during fire incidents, so that firefighters can reach the scene faster and ensure an adequate water supply for extinguishing the fire.
- They also suggest having additional hydrants and fire extinguishers in the community. Ideally, each house should have one fire extinguisher.
- They suggest that barangay workers will also be given training on how to respond to fire incidents in case firemen take long to get to the fire scene.
- They also suggest that commercial establishments should have their respective emergency response teams to help control emergency situations like fire incidents.

- On specific personnel shortages they encounter during firefighting situations:

  Paco: Lack of enough personnel in the fire station. There are only four firemen per shift when there should be at least seven to adequately respond to fire situations, especially those that last for 1-2 hours.

  Santa Ana: The firefighters reported that they have become accustomed to working with limited resources and have learned to adapt using whatever is available. Despite having a small team, they continue to manage their responsibilities. There are times when manpower is insufficient due to emergencies or personnel transfers without

replacements, but they persist in carrying out their duties despite being understaffed.

San Nicolas: They generally do not experience a shortage in personnel, as each firetruck is typically staffed with the required seven personnel. They emphasized that as long as every member performs their assigned role properly, firefighting operations run effectively despite other challenges.

Volunteers: They do not have shortages in terms of personnel. They follow a personnel duty system and they have enough manpower compliments (total of 25 in their station).

- What are your coping techniques to still be able to perform your job as firefighters with these shortages?

  Paco: As a coping technique for their shortage of personnel, some of them do multitasking. For example, the firetruck driver also plays the role of automechanic. They also make sure they have enough rest during their days off. They also just pray that there would not be frequent fire incidents.

  Santa Ana: Firefighters reported that despite being understaffed, they manage their duties by working with whoever is available and enduring physical and mental strain. They rely on experience to compensate for the lack of personnel, taking turns when possible, and pushing themselves to ensure fire suppression remains effective even with limited resources.

- Whether or not they think these coping or adaptive techniques are enough to be able to effectively carry out their jobs during fire incidents:

Paco: They think that these coping mechanisms are not enough but they do not have a choice but to perform their duty to respond to fire situations. Otherwise, they will be sued. If they will not be able to cope with their shortages, they will just have to resign.

Santa Ana: Firefighters stated that they make their resources and personnel sufficient through experience, ensuring effective fire suppression even when equipment or manpower is limited.

- On their recommendations, with respect to shortages on personnel, to be able to effectively carry out their jobs during fire incidents:

Paco:

- They suggest adding more personnel to meet the ideal number which is seven personnels per shift to respond to fire incidents more effectively and prevent exhaustion.
- Increase budget for additional manpower

Santa Ana:

- Recruit more firefighters.

IV. For RQ4: The respective responses of the FGD participants Paco Fire Sub Station and Ermita Malate Fire and Rescue Volunteer:

- On how they usually coordinate with other stations when responding to a fire incident and the communication systems or protocols that are being used:

Paco:

- They use radio, cellphone, telephone, and group chats as coordination tools.
- It is their mother communication unit which determines the appropriate fire station that will respond to a fire incident in a specific area. The mother communication unit will also be the one to coordinate with that identified fire station.
- A running card is a standard tool to determine which stations should respond to a fire in a specific area and how many stations should respond and coordinate depending on the fire alarm level.

Santa Ana: Firefighters explained that coordination during critical fires is handled through a centralized communications unit. Using radios, phones, and a "running card" system, stations are automatically dispatched once an alarm is raised, with roles and positioning coordinated by the BFP communications department rather than through direct station-to-station contact.

San Nicolas: The firefighters coordinate with other fire stations through a running card system, which designates which stations respond to each alarm level. Upon verification of a fire, multiple stations are automatically deployed based on the running card. Coordination is carried out using radio communication and phone calls through the BFP communications section to ensure organized and timely response.

Volunteers:

    - They have a mother organization that receives emergency calls or reports. This organization then relays the information to the fire stations under its command, specifying the emergencies each station needs to respond to. Each volunteer group communicates with other volunteer groups through the mother organization.
    - In the case of large fire incidents, an incident command post is established to serve as the central source of information for evacuation, relief, firefighting operations, crowd management, and transportation.

- On how quickly they can establish contact with other stations:

  San Nicolas: Contact with other fire stations is established immediately, usually within less than a minute, through the official radio communication system. Fire alarms and initial information are broadcast by dispatch and monitored by all stations, with follow-up details shared via radio, phone calls, and visual updates.

  Volunteers: Very fast. Through radio comms or Facebook live.

- On a recent critical fire incident they responded to that involved multiple stations and on how the coordination process between the stations unfolded:

  Santa Ana: Firefighters described that during large-scale fires, multiple stations respond once the alarm level is raised. An incident command post is established, led by an incident commander who assigns positions and

tasks to each unit, coordinates resources across Manila and neighboring cities, and ensures organized and efficient fire suppression.

San Nicolas: They cited the Happyland fire as a recent critical incident involving many fire stations. The fire escalated to Task Force Charlie and up to a fifth alarm, prompting the response of all BFP Manila stations as well as nearby cities, each with their respective commanders. Additional alarms were raised mainly due to water shortages and difficulty penetrating the area, requiring more units to support the operation.

Volunteers: They reported a major fire incident affecting both a commercial area and a residential area in Makati. The primary responders were the BFP, while the volunteer groups provided assistance. Firefighting operations were carried out effectively through radio communications and the coordination provided by the command post.

- On the common challenges that arise or they encounter when coordinating with other stations during a critical fire incident:

  Paco:

  - BFP firemen find it hard to coordinate with volunteer firemen during fire incidents because they have different chains of command and strategies. Thus, their acts in responding to fire incidents are not in unison.
  - They experience weak or poor antenna radio signals that make it difficult for them to coordinate with other stations during fire.

- They have low-tech with low radio frequency systems which are not subscribed with National Telecommunication Company (NTC).

Santa Ana: Firefighters reported no major coordination issues between stations due to a centralized communications unit handling dispatch and messaging. However, communication difficulties sometimes arise because of signal dead zones and limited radio frequency coverage in certain areas, which can hinder message transmission during fire responses.

San Nicolas:

- Coordination between stations followed a formal incident command system. The first responding unit established an incident command post, where all arriving stations checked in, reported their manpower, equipment, and vehicles, and awaited instructions from the ground commander. This ensured accountability and organized deployment, supported by the running card system.
- As for challenges, they reported no major communication barriers between stations. Despite minor rivalry or joking among units, coordination remained effective because all teams focused on a single objective: extinguishing the fire.

Volunteers: They encounter jammed frequency in radio communication during fire situations.

- Whether they experienced any issues regarding the sharing of resources, and how it impacts the collaboration between stations:

San Nicolas: There were no conflicts regarding the sharing of resources between stations. However, collaboration was indirectly affected by the overall lack of equipment, as there were very limited resources available to share in the first place. The main issue was not unwillingness to cooperate, but the insufficiency of resources, which constrained inter-station support during operations.

Volunteers: None, because when they borrow equipment from other stations and vice versa, they return them in good condition and on time.

- On how differences in equipment, procedures, and experience levels affect their coordination during critical fire incidents:

  Santa Ana: Firefighters reported that equipment sharing between stations is common and does not negatively affect collaboration, as stations routinely lend tools such as ladders and hoses when needed. Differences in equipment, procedures, and experience levels do not significantly hinder coordination, since stations generally have similar resources and receive the same training.

  San Nicolas: Differences in equipment, procedures, and experience levels did not significantly disrupt coordination during critical fire incidents because operations strictly followed a clear chain of command. Decisions were ultimately based on hierarchy, with the highest-ranking officer assuming control and issuing tactical instructions. While individual responders or commanders might have differing opinions based on experience or perspective, these disagreements did not affect coordination,

as all personnel were expected to comply with the directives of the incident commander to maintain order and operational effectiveness.

Volunteers: The differences among various volunteer groups in terms of equipment and firefighting expertise generally benefit operations, as they complement and support each other. For example, a volunteer station that does not have an ambulance can borrow one from another station. Similarly, when a situation requires expertise in water rescue or high-angle rope rescue, they rely on other volunteer groups for assistance.

- On how command structure is established when multiple stations respond to a critical fire incident:

  Paco: Fire stations have designated officers in command, each supervising the firefighters under their authority during fire incidents. Using a running card as a guide, the officer in command is determined by the fire alarm level. For a Level 1 alarm, the ground commander of the responding station assumes command. For Level 2 or 3 alarms, the Chief Operations Officer takes command, and for even higher alarm levels, the Chief of the Manila Fire District assumes overall command.

  Santa Ana: Firefighters explained that when multiple stations respond to a fire, operations follow an incident command system. An incident command post is established, and the incident commander serves as the leader, making decisions that guide all fire suppression activities.

  Volunteers: They coordinate through the command in post.

- On who takes the lead and they come to that decision:

Volunteers: The one in command during fire incidents could be the officer in charge, the deputy, or the fire chief deputy depending on the fire alarm.

- On whether they encountered problems in terms of the chain of command or decision-making:

  Paco: There are almost no issues, as the chain of command is well-structured and followed during fire incidents according to the running card. In large fire incidents, officers in command from different fire stations coordinate effectively with each other. While coordinating, they also supervise their respective personnel who are responding to the fire.

  Santa Ana: Firefighters reported experiencing coordination issues related to the chain of command, particularly when multiple officers arrive and give overlapping or changing instructions. Confusion arises when officers of different ranks issue successive orders, making it unclear which command should be followed during operations.

  San Nicolas: They acknowledged experiencing issues with chain of command and decision-making during chaotic fire incidents. High stress, mixed emotions, and the urgency of operations sometimes led to shouting and even throwing equipment to get attention. Despite these challenges, such conflicts were considered part of the job, and any problems were addressed afterward through debriefings and post-fire analysis to settle issues and improve future operations.

  Volunteers: Yes, when there are different/conflicting orders from the respective heads of the volunteer groups.

- On how the leaders of different stations collaborate and work together to make decisions during fire incidents:

  Paco: During fire incidents, an Incident Command Post (ICP) is established to facilitate collaboration. Officers exchange information and plan together to handle the fire incident effectively while overseeing their firefighters in the field.

  Santa Ana: Leaders from different stations collaborate through meetings at the incident command post, led by the highest-ranking officer. Decisions are discussed among station leaders and then disseminated to ensure coordinated action during fire operations.

  San Nicolas: Leaders from different fire stations coordinate through a strict command structure. Decisions are discussed within the command group, but the final directive comes from the highest-ranking officer, and all personnel follow it, even if they personally disagree. This hierarchy ensures order and consistency during fire operations.

- On what practices have been effective in improving the coordination between stations:

  Paco: The Running Card is used as a guide to determine which station(s) should respond and coordinate based on the fire alarm level. Volunteer leaders meet once a month to collaborate, exchange information, and share techniques, which they also learn from other volunteer groups.

Santa Ana: Effective coordination between stations is achieved through radio communication and meetings led by the incident commander, where decisions are communicated clearly to all station leaders.

San Nicolas: They find that coordination between stations improves through regular interaction outside of emergencies. Activities such as drills, exercises, meetings, and even social or religious gatherings help them build rapport, maintain communication, and strengthen relationships, which translates into smoother collaboration during actual fire responses.

- Whether they have encountered problems in terms of the chain of command or decision-making:

  Volunteers: Orders and instructions from the heads of different volunteer groups are not always harmonized.

- On changes they would have to make coordination between stations more effective:

  Paco: They barely have suggestions, as communication among BFP stations has been effective so far. They only reiterated the need to add more radios to facilitate effective communication with other firefighters during fire incidents.

  Santa Ana: Coordination could be improved by providing all stations with reliable radios and clear, uninterrupted frequencies. They also emphasized the value of post-fire analysis meetings and continuous incident command training to strengthen communication and coordination across stations.

San Nicolas: They believe that coordination between stations can be further strengthened not by changing procedures, but by deepening camaraderie. They suggest more off-duty interactions (such as spiritual activities, sports, or social gatherings) to build stronger personal bonds and maintain the long-standing sense of brotherhood within the fire service.

Volunteers: The government, through the BFP, should initiate common training programs for all volunteer groups, as these groups serve as support during fire incidents. The government should also implement measures to ensure that all volunteer groups are well-coordinated with each other and with BFP personnel.

Appendix F

Barangay 105 Interview

Interviewees Demographics

- Nelson Labay – Assistant EXPO/guest officer, 4 years in service; receives and records complaints, assists during incidents.
- Digno Villano – Barangay Tanod, 4 years in service; responds to reports of disturbances and assists as first responder during fires.

Roles During Fires and Coordination With BFP/Volunteers

- Barangay tanods act as first responders, assists on scene, and helps with crowd control and evacuation before and during the arrival of firefighters.

- They use radio communication to coordinate with BFP and other fire stations, relaying reports from residents and requesting fire response.
- The barangay court serves as the evacuation center, where fire victims temporarily stay while the area is being cleared.

Resident Behaviors, Obstructions, and Recorded Incidents

- During critical fire incidents, residents usually panic and rush out with their belongings, blocking the roads and entry points of firefighters.
- Common obstructions include piled garbage, junkshop materials, and sidecars/tricycles of scavengers, particularly in Aroma.
- There are no formal blotter records of obstruction, harassment, or tampering with hydrants; however, they recall an incident (seen on Facebook, not formally reported) where a rock was thrown at a fire truck during a fire in Aroma. There are also incidents where civilians have tried to grab hoses wanting to prioritize their own houses.
- The person who threw the stone was never identified; no one was injured, only the fire truck's windshield was damaged.

Proper and Improper Resident Behavior During Fires

- The interviewees say residents should avoid blocking access roads, keep sidecars and garbage off the streets, and instead use eskinitas when evacuating so that fire trucks can pass through easily.
- Barangay officials and coordinators always warn residents against obstructions and report blocked paths so these can be cleared before any incident.

- Unsafe or problematic behaviors include burning junk and trash, crowding of streets, and interfering with equipment such as hoses.
- However, they also note that some residents also show bayanihan, helping pass water and assist neighbors.

Crowd Control, Evacuation, Water Source, and Support

- During fires, residents or officials immediately inform the barangay, which then contacts the fire department and deploys tanods for traffic and crowd control.
- All victims are brought to the barangay court and upper floors of the barangay hall, as there are no other evacuation centers.
- There are no functional fire hydrants in the area; water is taken from the fire trucks, and if needed, from the nearby sea.
- DSWD and the city hall provide food packs, temporary shelters (tents), and other assistance donated by politicians, which the interviewees describe as sometimes “more than enough.”

Existing Programs, Training, Materials, and Recommendations

- BFP conducts training at the barangay court on fire prevention and proper use of fire extinguishers.
- The barangay chairman distributed fire extinguishers to each building/coordinator, which the interviewees say helps residents control small fires before they grow.
- They believe hands-on demonstrations and presentations by BFP and DILG are the most effective educational materials, more than just posters

or flyers, because residents learn by seeing and practicing use of fire extinguishers.

- They suggest training from BFP/DILG focused on safety, extinguisher use, and clearing obstructions, as well as completing the seawater pump project to secure an additional reliable water source for future fires.

Appendix G

Barangay 52 Interview

Interviewee's Demographics

- Ayson Basa – ex-barangay kagawad for 2 terms (2010-2018), now working as a Barangay secretary starting 2024. Located at Barangay 52, Zone 4, District 1, City of Manila at 777 Mercado Street. He does paperworks and records meetings and is a runner for the chairman.
- His role in critical fire incidents is, along with other barangay employees, he watches CCTVs in case of fire emergencies. He also acknowledges that there are fire extinguishers around their barangay. He simply follows the chairman' s orders and fills up paperwork such as complaint letters, and fire victims' papers to pass to DSWD.
- He says that it is the chairman and officers who coordinate with the BFP and firefighter volunteers during responses. He, on the other hand, prepares barangay indigency certificates of those whose houses were burned down, to submit to the DSWD so that they may be able to receive assistance. Then, on the chairman's

instruction, he also writes letters requesting help for the fire victims from senators.

Resident Behaviors, Obstructions, and Recorded Incidents

- There is unity in their barangay when there is fire. People help each other during fire incidents. They would climb houses to help residents, even when they do not live there. People would help throw water on fire, get the fire hoses, set aside crowds with children.
- On the other hand, there are also people who would steal the hoses from firefighters and fight over it.
- They have no blotter entries, but simply reports about people who grab hoses from firefighters.
- He also says that obstructions are unavoidable, though the chairman plans on doing clearing operations. They also have several occasions where they almost arrested obstructors.
- They simply reprimand children who are holding lighters/things that could cause fire.
- There are several reports of people taking hoses from firefighters; however, there are no official records regarding it. The only incident reports they have are of the fires themselves.
- Though they acknowledge harassment and obstructions, they do not have official records regarding it. The harassers simply ask for forgiveness to the firefighters.
- Though they do their best to assist in fire situations, they do not know how to control or reprimand bystanders; however, there are some who are cooperative

and follow orders. There are also some who bully the reprimandors and do not cooperate.

- According to him, residents should know how to understand that firefighters know how to do their jobs. He also acknowledges that residents are uncooperative because their feelings are heated in the moment of disaster. The barangay employees sympathize with the fire victims despite what they say or do.
- The chairman instructs him not to get angry at the fire victims; instead, help them with their needs.
- They do not base their arrests on hearsay; rather, they need evidence. They do not conduct investigations; however, if many are complaining/reporting, then they will bring the suspects to the barangay and question them. Then, depending on the situation, they file incident reports, formally reported complaints, or simply record it for the blotter.
- The barangay prepares a record of the fire incident as to when , and where it happened and whose houses have been affected. They do not call this as an incident report and they do not forward such records to the BFP. It is the BFP who prepares detailed and complete incident reports. BFP normally does not request from the barangay their record on the fire incident, instead BFP would normally interview the barangay personnel to help them complete the BFP's incident report.
- For the barangay personnel crowd control can be very difficult at the start especially on those whose houses are burning and with relatives left in those houses. But later on ,they still persist to do crowd control by respectfully asking

the crowd , with the help of the barangay Chair using a megaphone, to give way to the entry of fire trucks and firemen in the scene.

- The Barangay Chair helps by leading a drive to reconstruct the houses of the fire victims, clearing the road during fire incidents, and clearing the trash on the road after the fire incident.
- During the fire incident , the barangay coordinates with the residents by announcing using "kalampag" or anything that makes noise to announce the fire in the area, and where it is specifically so that affected residents would go out of the fire site. They also advise the residents and bystanders to clear the way to ease entry of firetrucks with firemen.
- At the onset of the fire, at times, there are residents,especially those whose house is burning, who hamper immediate response of firemen by grabbing the hose from firemen . Firemen and barangay personnel could not immediately stop them. However they eventually are able to control them. Then later in the scene, residents and barangay personnel tend to help firemen by helping in connecting hoses and throwing hoses to the firemen.
- The Barangay does not have a formal training or material that teaches or orientates residents as to what they should do during fire incidents. They however help residents by adding supply of fire extinguishers in the area, and by doing the announcements during fire incidents. They also remind residents to be aware of their house number to help firemen access affected residences during fire situations.

- Though there is no formal separate training or material that orients residents about what to do during fire incidents, the Barangay Chair conducts general assembly twice a year to remind residents which include reminders about preventing fire incidents and somehow touch on the topic about dealing with fire incidents. And during the new year the barangay announces to the residents that fireworks/firecrackers are not allowed to prevent fire incidents.
- The barangay ensures enough supply of fire extinguishers. They make sure to have fire extinguishers on each small street in the barangay and advise residents about it.They have tarpaulin signage which relates the proper use of fire extinguisher but they are not able to display it yet.
- Having supply of fire extinguishers somehow help residents have peace of mind that in case of an incident that could start a fire in the area , they and the barangay could stop the fire even at its onset thru the use of fire extinguishers even without calling the help of firemen. The barangay has already successfully done such.
- During Fire prevention month, the Municipal Mayor sends a memorandum to the Barangay to prompt the Barangay and the residents on fire prevention reminders and to make them alert. The Barangay Chair and Kagawads have connections to BFP and certain firemen that could help them in case of fire incidents. Certain government agencies like DSWD, DILG, DTI, and BFP show their support to them during and after fire incidents. Certain senators, congressmen, and vloggers do the same.
- According to the interviewee(s) from the Barangay, material like poster will help them change for the better the attitude of residents during fire incidents. This will

be on top of their poster/tarp which they need to post regarding the proper use of fire extinguishers.

- Also according to them, a seminar or orientation of the Barangay personnel and residents by BFP will be of help to them in shaping for the better the attitude of residents during fire incidents. They said that they will suggest to the Barangay Chair the inclusion of such during their general assembly or during fire prevention month.
- The interviewee from the barangay reiterated that their certain connection to BFP like having a kagawad in their Barangay who is also a BFP officer and having a cousin from BFP helps them coordinate with BFP during fire incidents.
- The Barangay does not have its own fire truck as they do not have enough budget for it. Also they do not have enough space where they can park a fire truck. So they just rely solely on BFP fire trucks.

Appendix H

PNP Station 1 Interview

Interviewee Demographics

- Corporal Manaloto – Crime Investigator, 8 years in service, Station 1, Raxabago

Roles During Fires and Coordination With BFP/Volunteers

- Makes incident reports and takes basic information about citizens involved in the fire incident.

- During fire incidents, they automatically call and coordinate with BFP and fire volunteers.

Resident Behaviors, Obstructions, and Recorded Incidents

- During critical fire incidents, he observes that some residents are respectful and cooperative while others can become aggressive due to the situation.
- He recalls a major fire in the area of Aroma (Barangay 105) wherein the fire lasted for many hours. Residents were grabbing and fighting over the hoses to try and help put out the fire.
- In official records, there are no formal complaints made specifically about obstruction of fire trucks, harassment of firefighters, or tampering of water sources. Most issues are only brought up through social media posts. When they see these online, they try to coordinate with the original poster and identify those involved in the issue.

Proper and Improper Resident Behavior During Fires

- He says that the main behavior that residents should avoid is aggressiveness because it can lead to disorder and interfere with the duties of the firefighters.

Crowd Control, Evacuation, Water Source, and Support

- For crowd control, clearing, and evacuation, police act as the first responders and immediately coordinate with the BFP so more fire trucks can arrive.

- The PNP handles the road clearing so that firefighters can pass the roads. There are also officers assigned in evacuation areas to handle the chaos or the crowd, and also assist in providing aid from other local agencies.

Existing Programs, Training, Materials, and Recommendations

- He believes it would be beneficial if BFP conducts programs or seminars especially in high risk areas like Barangay 105 to teach residents on proper behavior during critical fire incidents to avoid chaos.
- He also suggests materials that could teach residents on how to avoid or prevent fires as well as what to do when there is a critical fire incident.

Appendix I

Interview of Operations Officer/Fire Safety Inspector (on Fire Hydrants) in Paco Fire Sub Station, Santa Ana Fire Station, and San Nicolas Fire Station:

- The interviewees:

Paco:

- Fire Inspector Anabelle Padilla–Commander of Paco Fire Station
- FO1 Christian Tabago–Crew

Santa Ana: SFO1 Redento Gapyz–Chief In Charge of Santa Ana Fire Station, Fire Safety Inspector

San Nicolas:

- FO2 Rosito Arboleda II assigned at San Nicholas Fire Station, Manila established in 1903.

- On who is officially responsible for the maintenance of public fire hydrants in the city/municipality:

  Paco: BFP because they are the ones who check the fire hydrants. If there are problems with the hydrants, they report it to Maynilad so they may fix the hydrants.

  Santa Ana: The primary responsibility for maintaining public fire hydrants in the city lies with the water supplier, Maynilad. Firefighters themselves only conduct inspections to identify hydrants that are not functioning properly, performing regular checks but not the actual maintenance or repairs.

  San Nicolas: Care and maintenance of fire hydrants are the responsibility of water concessionaires which are Maynilad / Manila Waters.

- How this responsibility is communicated to the BFP:

  Paco: They immediately report hydrant problems to Maynilad. In addition, they submit a monthly report to the office, which also conducts follow-ups with Maynilad.

  Santa Ana: Firefighters follow a standard operating procedure that includes checking fire hydrants to ensure water access during emergencies. Any issues found are reported to the authorities, and coordination with the water supplier, Maynilad, is guided by an existing Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which legally allows the Bureau of Fire Protection to use the hydrants.

San Nicolas: Their station does regular inspection of the status of hydrants in their area and prepares a checklist as to which are functional, non- functional, those which are with blockage , those which are tapped for personal use, etc. The station forwards it to their district office which in turn forwards it to Maynilad/Manila Waters.

- On how often fire hydrants fail or become unusable during fire incidents, based on their experience:

  Paco: There are many cases of unusable fire hydrants that take months for Maynilad to fix.

  Santa Ana: Fire hydrants in Manila generally function properly, with malfunctions occurring mainly during maintenance or repairs by Maynilad. However, in certain remote areas, such as the port zone, water pressure or supply may be insufficient, making some hydrants effectively unusable.

  San Nicolas: Fire hydrants in their area are generally usable at all times But the water flow can vary.: it can be strong or weak, or none as it can sometimes be affected by pipeworks by Maynilad/Manila Waters

- On what the most common problems are encountered with fire hydrants (e.g., no water, low pressure, damaged valves):

  Paco:

  - All of the above mentioned (no water, low pressure, damaged valves)
  - There is obstruction from road constructions.

- Some hydrants have no valve at all
- Some hydrants have their water supply cut off by Maynilad due to hydrants being closer to each other than the minimum distance requirement
- There are hydrants that have low pressure, especially in the Sampaloc area, where hydraulic pressure has schedules.

Santa Ana:

- There are people that choose to park in front of the fire hydrant; sometimes there are pedicabs locked to the post of the hydrant.
- In some depressed areas, some people damage the valves in order to access free water by attaching hose/s to the damaged valves.

San Nicolas: Low pressure, defective valve, lack of enough number of hydrants

- On what the procedure is when a fire hydrant is found to be non-functional:

Paco:

- During fire incidents, they coordinate with Maynilad and call them so they would strengthen the water pressure of the hydrants.
- They make a letter and directly send it to Maynilad. They also do follow ups when Maynilad takes a long time to respond to their requests for repairs.

Santa Ana:

- They do regular inspections, about 1-2 times a week. If the hydrant/s are not functioning, they add this to their report.

- They do a mapping of hydrants that aren't functioning, report to the office, then forward it to Maynilad.

San Nicolas:

- They prepare a report about the status of the hydrants then forward it to the district office who in turn forwards it to Maynilad/Manila Waters for maintenance or repair as needed.
- They cannot pressure Maynilad/Manila Waters to respond immediately or on time as water concessionaire because hydrants are not public property. They are owned by Maynila/Manila Waters.

- On which office or agency the BFP coordinates with regarding hydrant repairs:

  Paco: Maynilad

  Santa Ana: Maynilad/Manila Waters

  San Nicolas: Maynilad/Manila Waters

- On how effective the coordination between BFP and the responsible LGU or water utility is:

  Paco: It is difficult to coordinate with them regarding hydrants because they take too long (years) to repair them, and until now, many hydrants are defective. This is because Maynilad knows which hydrants to prioritize. For example, they would not repair a defective fire hydrant that is close to another working one.

  Santa Ana: Coordination is effective. They work on fixing damages and grant requests to reopen hydrants when proposed. Although the time that

projects are granted is not specified, BFP still works with them specifically with fixing damages.

San Nicolas: Coordination with BFP is effective during fire incidents when they need stronger water pressure from functional hydrants, Maynilad responds on time as water concessionaire.

- On how a non-functional fire hydrant affects fire suppression operations:

Paco:

- Firefighters are aware of which hydrants are unusable; therefore, they do not go to them during fire incidents.
- Drawing water from the hydrants takes longer because if a nearby hydrant is defective, they must go to a more distant one, which delays the process.
- The number one problem in fire operations is defective fire hydrants, as a firetruck's water supply lasts only a few minutes. If a hydrant has low pressure or other damages, it causes significant delays in firefighting efforts.

Santa Ana: This has a big effect/consequences because this means that there would be no source of water, thus no way to extinguish the fire.

San Nicolas:

- Having non-functional hydrants near the fire site causes delay on the side of firemen in responding to the fire as they have to look for functional hydrants that can reload trucks with water , and these hydrants could be farther from the fire area. Such a delay which for

example can be 20 minutes could have a great adverse impact on the area affected by fire.

- On what alternative measures are taken when hydrants are not working:

  Paco: They draw water from other bodies of water such as rivers. They also ask for help from firefighter volunteers. And when the fire is getting bigger, they raise the alarms and tap other stations so that there will be more suppliers of water.

  Santa Ana: One option is to fetch water from an available hydrant from afar. Another is called drafting, where the water is drawn from a river, sea, or other bodies of water available. But this is their last resort as the soiled/unclean water can damage the machines used. Although avoided as much as possible, this is what they resort to in bigger fires with no water sources such as in Tondo or other depressed areas.

  San Nicolas: They do the process called drafting where they extract water from any nearby source of water like river, creek, or even canal.

Appendix J

Interview of Fire Senior Superintendent in BFP Headquarters:

- The interviewee:
  - F/SSUPT Edwin P. Vargas
- About the budget:
  - They allocate it for high quality equipment, not substandard. There is also human resources to allocate, such as yearly recruitment yet still personnel

aren't enough. Training service works based on the budget being given. While the modernization act was able to provide fund for new equipment and be able to better emergency response, it still lacks a lot.

- About training and modules:
    - There is mandatory training and standardized modules. Promotion and officership, a mandatory training is along with it. Whilst for specialized training, it is for the ones who are able to afford it, but they wished for it to be accessible for all who want to. For re-training, there is currently only one facility for it, but there are satellite schools being established, but still limits contact than usual.
- About fire hydrants and water systems:
    - It is not imposed on all regions and places and it is under LGU's responsibilities, not BFP. BFP has records about status ng operational and non-operational ng hydrants, and they keep in check on the condition of the fire hydrants from time to time.
- About the communication system:
    - There is a communications system, being radios, but are not that reliable in certain types and also degrades in time, noting it would be nice to have better communications. To address this issue, there are fire alarm systems and a designated ground commander.
- On civilians lack of knowledge:
    - The lack of knowledge of the public about fire fighters and on what to do on fire situations, to address this issue BFP would contact local fire

brigades and also the community to explain the work of a fire fighter and encourage them to volunteer.

Appendix K

Interview with DILG representative

- The interviewee

  Mariannete Privado – Administrative Officer V Chief, Qualifications and Evaluation Section Examining Division, Personnel and Administrative Service.

- How budgeting for each organization gets approved

  DILG has regional offices throughout the Philippines, for all their operations, plans and for budgeting. Each office has a committee to represent each office. Once the regional offices have finalized their plans and budgeting is done, it is then submitted to central government offices and is later handed off to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), the central agency that consolidates all the budgets for the offices of the government. After that, the budget proposal is then brought to the congress for deliberation. Once the congress is done with deliberation, the budget proposals are forwarded to the president for approval. The president typically approves the proposed budgets for each office before the start of the new year.

- Where the government gets its budget

The government usually gets its budgets from the taxes it collects from people and the revenue it earns from government business operations. If the money isn't enough, the government may also borrow money from the World Bank. The government submits proposals, and the World Bank assesses the capability of the government to pay the borrowed money back. It looks into tax collection, investments, and on-going projects the government has that have the potential for earning revenue. Central government offices may also fill in budget proposals if the budget for regional offices aren't enough.

- Budgeting for the BFP

Each year, the BFP submits an OPB to the DBM. This details the programs and projects they plan to do in that year, and their requested budget allotment for that year, This also includes salaries. However much the budget the BFP requests for that year, that will be the only amount they will receive for that year. The BFP's budget slightly increases each year due to inflation and slight increase of the allowed budget ceiling. The leftover budget from last year also gets recycled into the following year's planned budget.

Appendix L

Interview with BFP Trainer

- The interviewee:

  Par Senior Inspector Gabriel Solano, the Chief Program Development and Monitoring Section, the parent Chief Visual Media Management Section of the Public Par Education Division.

- On whether they are aware of the actual challenges that firefighters encounter in the field when applying the training they received (based on their experience as a trainer):

  They are aware of the actual difficulties firefighters face when applying their training in the field. Through years of handling community relations at the BFP, the office has relied on field-based data to understand these constraints, particularly during community-focused training. One identified challenge was the lack of standardized training materials. To address this, the BFP developed and released a series of books to provide consistent resources, while maintaining awareness of field conditions through continuous engagement with personnel.

- On how they learn about these constraints—through reports, feedback from trainees, or personal field experience?

  The office gathers information about field challenges through consultative meetings and direct engagement with their "clients," which include both BFP personnel (trainers) and the community. Before implementing any policy or program, they conduct public consultations and focus group discussions (FGDs),

inviting sectoral representatives from various parts of society. This ensures that the materials developed are responsive to actual needs.

Using these inputs, the BFP created a standardized public fire-education manual, available as a seven-book series online. Each book is sector-specific, with tailored strategies for children, young adults, the general public, persons with disabilities (PWDs), and senior citizens. He emphasized that while the fire safety message may be the same, the content and delivery must differ depending on the audience's age, knowledge, and societal context to be effective.

- On how training lessons are affected by narrow roads and heavy traffic during actual fire responses:

  Actual fire responses are heavily affected by narrow streets and severe traffic, which makes applying training difficult. Training centers, like NFTI, provide a controlled and nearly perfect environment to facilitate learning, but real-life conditions in the field are very different.

  To address this, the BFPA trains its personnel not only in optimal conditions but also teaches them to anticipate and adjust for real-world scenarios. Because BFPA training is skills-based rather than academic or bookish, firefighters' bodies are trained to react instinctively to sudden changes in the field. For instance, if a firetruck cannot penetrate crowded streets, firefighters adapt by using smaller vehicles that can navigate narrow alleys. This practical, adaptable approach distinguishes skills-based training from purely theoretical instruction.

- On whether issues like malfunctioning or insufficient fire hydrants are addressed in training, and the reason behind it if not:

Training does not fully address issues with malfunctioning or missing fire hydrants for two main reasons:

1. Control and maintenance of hydrants is under the local government and water providers (e.g., Maynilad), not the fire department.
2. Practical solutions rely on advanced planning, such as mapping areas without nearby hydrants and dispatching multiple fire trucks to ensure adequate water supply.

There are also recurring problems in Metro Manila: while many hydrants exist, some are hidden, blocked, poorly maintained, or even stolen. Residents sometimes block access by building fences around hydrants, or the hydrants are below ground, making them difficult to locate and use. This is why the BFP emphasizes partnerships with local governments and water providers to improve accessibility and maintenance.

- On how is crowd interference addressed in training, such as: civilians blocking the roads, civilians handling the hoses, and civilians becoming aggressive or violent:

Crowd interference during fire operations is addressed in training mainly through the principle of maximum tolerance. Firefighters are taught to avoid confrontation with civilians, even in situations where bystanders block roads, grab equipment, or act aggressively. For example, if a hose is forcibly taken, firefighters are instructed not to resist, as engaging civilians could escalate the situation and distract from life-saving operations.

Formal instruction on Crowd Dispersal Management (CDM) was more prominent in earlier training periods but is no longer emphasized consistently across all

batches. This shift is attributed to the increased and regular involvement of the PNP, barangay officials, and other security forces, whose responsibility is to manage crowds, allowing firefighters to focus on firefighting tasks.

Training content also evolves over time, with the National Fire Training Institute updating the curriculum approximately every three years. However, limitations such as time constraints, varying trainee receptiveness, instructor expertise, budget, and resource availability affect how thoroughly issues like crowd interference are covered. As a result, many firefighters learn to handle these situations through on-the-spot experience rather than purely formal training.

Overall, while crowd interference is acknowledged in training, it is addressed more through general behavioral principles (maximum tolerance) and inter-agency coordination than through detailed, standardized crowd-control instruction.

- On how training changes and addresses gaps in materials and communication:

  BFP training does not change every year but is generally updated on a cycle of around three years through the National Fire Training Institute (NFTI). Instead of continuous retraining, the Philippine approach focuses on mandatory, role-based training—for example, training required for promotion, assignment to a specific unit, fire safety inspection, or special rescue. This system is similar to that of other uniformed services in the country such as the PNP, BJMP, and AFP.

  Compared to some neighboring Asian countries like Malaysia, the Philippines lacks a system of continuous capability-building. In other countries, firefighters undergo retraining every six months to update their knowledge and skills. In

contrast, Philippine firefighters usually only receive additional training when required by position or rank, which creates gaps in skills reinforcement.

Regarding the issue of lack of training videos and inconsistent communication among staff, the interviewee confirmed that these concerns exist and are recognized. These gaps are partly due to the absence of regular retraining after actual fire responses. Even fire volunteers interviewed by the researchers expressed a desire for post-incident retraining or more frequent refresher courses. Currently, volunteers are only required to retrain every three years, which the speaker identified as a significant gap that could also apply to regular personnel.

The interviewee acknowledged that even if a dedicated BFP training service were created, constraints related to resources and location would still remain. In terms of resources, the primary limitation identified was budget. The Bureau of Fire Protection is allocated only a finite amount of funding for training, which must be stretched to cover all training-related needs.

Beyond training itself, the interviewee emphasized that funding must also be shared with equipment procurement and maintenance, particularly for personal protective equipment (PPE) and firefighting tools. Since firefighting is highly equipment-dependent, limitations in equipment funding directly affect the scope and quality of training.

The interviewee further explained that as the BFP gradually acquires more modern and sophisticated fire trucks and equipment, there is a corresponding need to upgrade the skills and capabilities of personnel who will operate them. Training, therefore, must evolve alongside equipment modernization. However,

because these upgrades occur incrementally due to budget constraints, training improvements also progress slowly.

Overall, financial limitations remain a major constraint in addressing training needs, even with structural improvements, and that modernization efforts require parallel investments in both equipment and human capability development.

The interviewee further explained that some constraints are not fully discussed or implemented in formal training due to several limiting factors:

- Time constraints within scheduled training programs
- Variations in trainees' ability to absorb instruction
- Differences in instructor expertise

To address these issues, the BFP has been working toward standardizing training content and instruction, with the goal of minimizing inconsistencies and ensuring that essential skills and knowledge are delivered more uniformly across trainees.

Overall, while the BFP recognizes shortcomings in training frequency, instructional materials, and communication consistency, efforts are being made through curriculum standardization to gradually resolve these limitations.

- On occasions when training is ideal or textbook-based, but difficult to apply in real-life community situations:

  Textbook-based training is often difficult to apply directly in real-life fireground situations, which is why uniformed services such as the BFP, AFP, and PNP do not rely heavily on purely theoretical instruction. Theoretical knowledge alone is insufficient when responding to unpredictable field conditions.

To address this gap, the BFP emphasizes a skills-based training approach, where only a small portion of instruction focuses on theory, while the majority prioritizes critical thinking, decision-making, and adaptive response.In designing training programs for cadets, approximately 30% is theory and 70% is focused on developing practical skills, including mental recall and muscle memory.

This approach prepares firefighters to respond instinctively and appropriately to sudden changes in the field, rather than relying on predefined textbook solutions. The interviewee emphasized that not all real-world problems have answers found in manuals, and thus training is designed to equip firefighters with the ability to think, act, and decide effectively under dynamic and unpredictable conditions.

- On whether there is a regular feedback mechanism from field units to trainers about problems encountered during actual operations:

  The presence of a regular feedback mechanism from field units to trainers varies depending on the area or training center. While the interviewee was unsure if this system is consistently implemented across all training centers, they confirmed that within their office, a regular reporting system is in place.

  Field units regularly submit reports and feedback, and this information is immediately acted upon. When operational personnel identify the need for adjustments in training or procedures, the office responds promptly by modifying or improving the training approach. This system allows trainers to remain responsive to actual field conditions and ensures that lessons learned from real operations are integrated into training programs.

- On whether there is a communication gap between BFP trainers and higher authorities or policymakers when it comes to updating training modules, in their opinion:

  There was a significant communication gap in the past between BFP trainers, higher authorities, and policymakers, particularly regarding training updates and capacity building. According to the interviewee, if the question had been asked five years ago, the answer would have been a definite yes.

  However, the interviewee emphasized that this gap has been gradually addressed since the enactment of the BFP Modernization Law (RA 11589) in 2021. One of the key provisions of this law was the creation of a dedicated BFP Training Service, which helped bridge the disconnect between management and field responders. Previously, management had its own expectations of how responders should be trained, while personnel in the field had different views on the skills and capacities they needed.

  Since 2021, the BFP has conducted multiple Training Needs Analyses (TNA) and Training Gap Analyses, including a recent one conducted around September–October of the previous year. These analyses now serve as a basis for planning, budgeting, and procurement related to training programs.

  The interviewee added that the modernization law also led to the creation of new offices and units, such as those handling community relations and special rescue forces, which helped address gaps in both training and operational response. Nonetheless, the interviewee noted that while many issues have been resolved, some gaps still remain and continue to be addressed over time.

- On whether there are constraints that trainers are aware of but cannot include in training due to policy, curriculum limitations, or lack of directives from higher command:

  There are constraints that are already known but are not immediately included in training programs due to policy limitations, curriculum restrictions, or the lack of directives from higher command. This is considered a normal situation within the organization.

  Even when a unit proposes a specific training need, final decisions remain with command authorities, who must weigh multiple priorities. As a result, some training needs may be recognized as valid but are deferred rather than implemented right away.

  This situation is not viewed as a backlog but as a matter of proper prioritization, where leadership determines which initiatives can be addressed first based on available resources and operational priorities.

- On whether the training provided to volunteers is sufficient, especially in specialized areas like HazMat and technical rescue (based on their knowledge):

  The training provided to fire volunteers is not considered sufficient for specialized areas such as hazardous materials (HAZMAT) response and advanced technical firefighting. However, this limitation is intentional, as such training is not required for volunteers.

  A clear distinction exists between the roles of Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) personnel and fire volunteers. BFP firefighters are public servants funded by taxpayers and are expected to risk their lives as part of their official duty. In

contrast, volunteers are present primarily to assist and act as force multipliers, rather than as primary responders.

For this reason, volunteer training deliberately excludes high-risk and highly specialized skills such as HAZMAT response, advanced rescue operations, and complex firefighting techniques. First, volunteers cannot be legally or ethically obligated to respond to such dangerous situations. Second, these operations are highly technical and require extensive, continuous training, which is typically reserved for regular BFP personnel.

Volunteers may, however, undergo appropriate and complementary training such as basic first aid, emergency medical services (EMS), and EMT-level instruction, which are also available to the general public. Those who wish to pursue specialized training may do so through private institutions or overseas programs, but this is no longer the responsibility of the BFP. Highly specialized firefighting training is commonly found in industrial settings, such as petroleum and gas refineries, where response requirements are area-specific.

- On how coordination with volunteers is addressed in training, particularly when they are sometimes restricted by BFP incident command:

  In terms of communication and command during actual operations, no significant communication gaps are observed. An established incident command system is in place, and volunteers are fully aware that they must operate under the authority of the BFP fire ground commander. The commander holds decision-making authority, including raising alarms, requesting additional units, and determining the deployment of resources, including volunteer equipment.

This structure is clearly defined in existing laws and operational policies. Since legal accountability and liability rest with the BFP, volunteers are required to follow BFP command directives. In practice, volunteers coordinate directly with the fire ground commander upon arrival and await instructions. There have been no reported incidents of serious conflict between BFP personnel and volunteers regarding command authority during operations.

- On whether there are clear guidelines in training on when and how volunteers should be integrated into fire operations (in their opinion):

  There are no clear guidelines in volunteer training regarding when and how volunteers should be integrated into fire operations. The only provision is found in the Fire Code, Rule 6, which states that during fire incidents, volunteers must operate under the authority of the BFP fire ground commander. Beyond this legal statement, there is currently no expanded policy or formal procedure.

  Attempts have been made by the BFP to federate volunteer groups into a unified organization, but these efforts have repeatedly failed. Volunteers tend to operate in independent groups, each with its own unit, vested interests, and local patronage. Some groups focus only on a specific area, while others specialize in different locations. As a result, volunteers often operate according to their own internal structures rather than a centralized system.

  Although efforts to unify volunteer operations have been made several times, discussions often end in heated debates between groups, preventing consensus. Occasionally, a unified structure has been established temporarily, sometimes

lasting for a year, but the groups eventually disbanded and returned to independent operations. Currently, the BFP continues to seek the right conditions to attempt integration again.

- On what should be changed or added to the training to make it more realistic and applicable to actual fire response conditions (in their opinion):

  Firefighting itself is not rocket science—it's essentially about dousing fires with water. What matters most is consistency in skills. Acquired skills and knowledge should not be lost; they must be practiced repeatedly so that they become muscle memory or automatic responses. In an actual fire scenario, responders will then act according to what they have repeatedly practiced.

  One way to improve training is to make it regular and consistent. This is something observed in countries like Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan, where firefighters undergo routine training and skill reinforcement as part of their daily activities. Embedding training consistently in daily operations ensures that skills remain sharp and immediately applicable in real-life situations.

- On what would be the first constraint they would like to address in training, and why (if given the opportunity):

  The main issue is consistency. If given the chance, they would implement regular skills enhancement, especially in firefighting and rescue. Completing basic training should not be the end, because basic training only covers the fundamentals. Real-world fire situations vary (today's fire is different from tomorrow's) and each incident teaches different lessons and strategies.

To respond effectively, training must be consistent and repetitive, so that skills become second nature and responders can act automatically during incidents.

Regarding resources, there are still shortages. The budget from the government limits what can be done. Without proper equipment, resources, and facilities, some training cannot be executed.

For example, advanced firefighting lacks proper modules, materials, and structured training. Additional ladderized skill modules are also missing. These kinds of modules would be very helpful to enhance capabilities and make training more realistic and applicable.